

Securitization in the Mortgage Market under General Equilibrium*

Salomón García[†]

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Abstract

How aggregate fluctuations in mortgage credit respond to liquidity and information frictions in the securitization market? I answer this question by developing a general equilibrium model in which heterogeneous banks interact in an endogenous securitization market that features adverse selection. During the Great Recession, I find that the liquidity dry up arising from the collapse of the securitization market accounted for thirty percent of the contraction of mortgage credit in the United States. Large fluctuations in mortgage credit and security issuance arise from fluctuations in the severity of information frictions and the degree of concentration among mortgage originators. A welfare analysis of the policy changes introduced after the Great Recession shows positive but unequal welfare gains among borrowers and bankers.

Keywords: Banking, DSGE, heterogeneous agents models, private information, liquidity frictions, securitization.

JEL codes: D5, D82, G21, G28

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[†]Banco de España, email: salomon.garcia@bde.es

1 Introduction

Securitization has become the largest source of funding to mortgage originators in the United States. From 2000 to 2019, mortgage originators sold or securitized on average 70 percent of all residential mortgages during the first year of origination.¹ However, this source of liquidity is volatile and sometimes collapses abruptly, and when this happens, the supply of mortgage credit to households follows in tandem. These large fluctuations have been associated to the presence of information frictions along the mortgage origination and securitization chain. Particularly relevant for the securitization market is the well documented adverse selection problem between better informed mortgage originators and security investors.² However, there are a number of key questions that remain unanswered: how important are these frictions to account for aggregate credit fluctuations? What is the channel of transmission of shocks from the securitization to the primary market? what policies can avoid collapses in the securitization market?

In this paper, I tackle these questions by developing a novel dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which heterogeneous banks interact in a dual mortgage market. I explicitly model a securitization market that features adverse selection as arising from information frictions between seller and buyers of mortgage-backed securities. I find that liquidity and information frictions in the securitization market accounted for one third of the total mortgage credit contraction during the Great Recession. The model's success in generating large fluctuations in both markets rests on two important forces: (i) the severity of information frictions, and (ii) the cross-sectional characteristics of the U.S. mortgage market. Then, I use the model to study the role of government policies in stabilizing liquidity and the provision of mortgage credit to households.

The model features two types of agents: borrowers and bankers, and two markets: a primary mortgage market and a securitization market. In the primary mortgage market, bankers extend long-term loans(mortgages) to borrowers. In the securitization market, bankers can sell their portfolio of outstanding loans and buy securities. Borrower households borrow to smooth their consumption of non-durable and housing goods in the presence of aggregate income and idiosyncratic housing risk, and can default on their mortgages.

Bankers have three main characteristics. First, they are heterogeneous in their loan origination costs. Second, bankers are financially constrained by having limited sources of income: cash payments from their maturing portfolio, and cash inflows from selling loans in the securitization market.

¹According to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database which accounts for almost the universe of mortgage originators in the United States.

²Adelino et al. (2018), Adelino et al. (2017), Keys et al. (2010), Downing et al. (2008) are among the large body of literature documenting that sellers of mortgage loans are better informed than prospective buyers about the quality of the loans. Furthermore, mortgage originators actively take advantage of such information asymmetry.

Third, bankers have private information about the probability of default of loans in their portfolio. Private information gives rise to an adverse selection problem, as in [Akerlof \(1970\)](#). Bankers that buy securities understand that a fraction of those turns out to have a low value because all bankers have incentives to sell non-performing loans and to selectively hold on to good-standing loans when the market price is lower than their valuation. Consequently, the private information friction reduces trade in the securitization market and lowers the liquidity available to bankers.

The model is able to replicate the dynamics observed in the data. Episodes of high—housing or income—risk induce borrower households to default on their mortgages which aggravates the adverse selection problem by discouraging some bankers from buying securities and others from selling their portfolio of good-standing loans. As a consequence, securities trade at a low price and the volume of security issuance falls. In the primary market, a large mass of bankers face a liquidity shock derived from the inability to cash their portfolio, which is further transmitted into a contraction of credit supplied to households.

I calibrate the model to match key moments of the cross section and time series of the U.S. mortgage market from 1990 to 2006, and simulated it for the sequence of income and housing depreciation shocks as observed in the data. During the Great Recession, approximately thirty percent of the aggregate credit contraction in the mortgage market can be attributed to information and liquidity frictions. I find that the severity of the adverse selection problem in the securitization and the degree of market concentration in the primary market are the two main forces behind the large fluctuations in both markets.

The transmission of fluctuations from the securitization to the primary market depends on the cross-sectional distribution of mortgage lending across bankers. I use granular data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act database to characterize the distribution of mortgage originators and discipline the model by matching its key moments. The main feature of the mortgage market is the high level of concentration among mortgage originators.³ Given this high levels of concentration, contractions in the volume of security issuance in the securitization market generate large contractions in the volume of credit in the primary market when some of the large originators are unable to securitize their portfolio.

To capture government involvement in the securitization market, I model government policies that compensate buyers for the losses associated to default risk when purchasing securities. The government finances this policy by imposing a fee (tax) on mortgage originators over the interest rate contracted with borrowers. The subsidy is a tractable way of capturing the role of the insurance provided by the Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) to buyers of mortgage-backed securities

³The mortgage market is highly concentrated among a few large originators: 10 percent of originators account for 90 percent of all new loan issuance to households in the primary residential mortgage market.

(MBS).⁴ This government policy encourages demand for securities, increasing both security issuance in the securitization market and mortgage credit to households in the primary market.

To understand the role of policy in stabilizing mortgage credit to households, I evaluate two major policy changes introduced in the securitization market after the Great Recession. First, the expansion of the market share of GSEs, which, starting from 2009 has accounted for close to the entire MBS market. Second, starting in 2012, the guarantee fee charged by GSEs to mortgage originators increased threefold. I find that these policy changes were effective in stabilizing the mortgage market by reducing the volatility of quantities and prices in both the primary and securitization markets compared with the benchmark economy. However, the cost of financing these policies increases substantially, leading to higher taxes on borrowers and bankers. An analysis of the welfare effects derived from these policy changes shows unequal gains among borrowers and bankers. Bankers benefit more than borrowers compared with the benchmark economy.

While a substantial amount of research has focused on the moral hazard cost of expanding GSEs—and finds little scope or no role for policy interventions—my analysis focuses on the interaction of liquidity and information frictions arising from adverse selection in securitization markets. I find that expanding government policy can have an important stabilization role. In particular, this paper contributes by highlighting two aspects of the benefits of government policy: the increase in liquidity to mortgage originators who actively participate in the securitization market and the reduction in lending costs from better reallocation of resources in the economy.

Related Literature. My work fits within the strand of literature that introduces financial frictions into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to account for large fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates. I contribute to this literature by studying the interactions of information and financial frictions to account for the joint dynamics of mortgage credit and housing consumption in a tractable DSGE model. [Justiniano et al. \(2015\)](#) argue that fluctuations in the supply of mortgage credit are quantitatively more important than fluctuations on the demand side—when borrowers are credit constrained—in explaining large fluctuations in the housing market. [Landvoigt \(2016\)](#) introduces securitization in a DSGE model by allowing a representative banker to sell a fraction of her stock to a more patient investor. My approach goes one step further by introducing heterogeneity in bankers’ origination costs which endogenously give rise to a securitization market. The securitization market not only provides liquidity but leads to an efficient allocation of resources among bankers, financial specialization, and lowers the cost of credit to households.⁵ Also, closer in scope to this paper is the work of [Hobijn and Ravenna \(2018\)](#), which

⁴In practice, GSEs, specifically Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, buy mortgages from originators, pack them into mortgage-backed securities, and insure MBS buyers against the default risk from borrower households.

⁵I model securitization in this manner for several reasons: it is associated with i) a lower cost of capital; ii) the

models securitization in an environment with asymmetries of information between mortgage originators and borrowers. In contrast, my paper focuses on the asymmetries of information between mortgage originators and security investors.⁶

A large body of literature documents the presence and relevance of asymmetries of information between mortgage originators and security investors in the MBS market, which gives rise to an adverse selection problem between both parties.⁷ [Downing et al. \(2008\)](#) find that in their portfolios, mortgage originators retain mortgages that are, on average, of better quality than mortgages sold and securitized in the agency segment of the MBS market. [Keys et al. \(2010\)](#) find evidence that when mortgage originators expect to retain rather than sell a loan, they screen it more carefully. [Elul \(2011\)](#) looks at prime mortgages traded in the private segment of the market and finds that the rate of delinquency for a typical prime loan is 20 percent higher if it is privately securitized. More recently, [Adelino et al. \(2018\)](#) look at the private segment of the MBS market during the period 2002-2007 and document that mortgage originators consistently retained the better-performing loans and sold those with poorer performance first. These magnitudes show that adverse selection is an economically relevant friction in the securitization market.

I build on an extensive theoretical literature that studies adverse selection in financial markets, a tradition that dates back to [Akerlof \(1970\)](#). In particular, my framework for modeling adverse selection draws on the work of [Kurlat \(2013\)](#) and shares elements present in [Eisfeldt \(2004\)](#), [Bigio \(2015\)](#), [Neuhann \(2016\)](#), and [Caramp \(2016\)](#). These papers show that adverse selection can generate large fluctuations in the volume of traded assets by amplifying the effects of exogenous shocks in the economy. Other models of adverse selection consistent with this feature are those developed by [Chari et al. \(2014\)](#), which incorporate reputation concerns, and [Guerrieri and Shimer \(2012\)](#); both works relax the assumption of non-exclusive markets. My paper builds on the insights of these theoretical frameworks to introduce information frictions in tractable way within a DSGE framework. Furthermore, my works identifies a mechanism by which liquidity shocks are amplified and transmitted from the securitization market to the primary mortgage market.

This paper also fits within the literature of quantitative and empirical papers measuring the role creation of high-quality safe assets by pooling risk, lowering bankruptcy, and lowering tax-related costs; and iii) gains from financial specialization (see [Gorton and Metrick \(2013\)](#) for an in-depth analysis).

⁶The adverse selection problem is, of course, not new in the mortgage market. The industry has developed numerous strategies for screening private information and reducing the losses associated with it. Among them are warranties, credit ratings, reputation effects, tranching, and repurchase agreement haircuts. See [Shimer \(2014\)](#) for a review of how the market deals with private information.

⁷There is scope for private information to arise along two different parts of the intermediation chain. Broadly speaking, the first part of that chain concerns the information asymmetries between borrower households and mortgage originators. The second part refers to the asymmetries of information between mortgage originators and mortgage investors, the focus of the literature presented here.

of liquidity frictions in financial markets. [Calem et al. \(2013\)](#) quantify the liquidity shock to banks derived from the collapse of the private-label RMBS market. They find that banks that had sold all of its jumbo loans in the securitization market reduced its jumbo lending by 6 times more than those banks that did not sell any of its jumbo loans.⁸ Looking at the Great Recession, I find a similar amplification arising from the liquidity banks obtain from the securitization market.

This paper contributes to the literature that studies the effects of government policies in the mortgage and housing markets. Along this line, [Elenev et al. \(2016\)](#) develop a general equilibrium model of the mortgage market that also emphasizes the role of the financial sector and the government. They focus on the moral hazard incentive created by under-priced mortgage default insurance that encourages the banking sector to take on higher leverage. My paper provides a complementary view of the effects of policies in the presence of adverse selection when abstracting from moral hazard and shows that policy has an enhanced role in the presence of such frictions.

Layout. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents motivating empirical observations. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents the theoretical analysis and Section 5 the quantitative analysis and main results, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Motivating Empirical Observations

This analysis is based on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data set, see the Appendix A for details about data treatment and constructions of variables.

2.1 Fluctuations in the Primary and Securitization Markets

The mortgage market in the United States comprises two markets: a primary mortgage market, where mortgage originators issue mortgage loans to households, and a securitization market, where mortgages are sold, bundled, and transformed into mortgage-backed securities, a process known as securitization. The primary market links home buyers and mortgage originators, while the securitization market brings together mortgage originators and investors.⁹


The volume of mortgage-backed securities issuance in the securitization market experiences large fluctuations and sometimes the market collapses. Because of its close connection to the primary

⁸Using HMDA and Call-Report data [Calem et al. \(2013\)](#) find that for a bank that sold all of its jumbo loans to the securitization market, and had an 8% tier 1 capital ratio immediately preceding the liquidity shock, reduced its jumbo lending relative to all conventional mortgage lending by 7.9 percentage points as a result of the collapse of the private-label RMBS market. In contrast, a bank with the same tier 1 capital ratio that did not sell any of its jumbo loans to the securitization market experienced a reduction in jumbo lending of only 1.3 percentage points.

⁹Most of these investors are financial institutions that manage large pools of savings, such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and sponsors of structured products.

market, these large fluctuations are transmitted to the volume of new originations of mortgage loans to households. Figure 1 shows how the volume of issuance of mortgage loans and the volume of issuance of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) move in tandem.

Figure 1: Primary and securitization mortgage markets




Source: Left panel from HMDA. Right panel from SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association). “Agency” corresponds to RMBS issuance by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. “Non-agency” corresponds to issuance by private institutions apart from GSEs. Numbers are in real terms, base year 2015.

This close connection is grounded on mortgage originators’ reliance on securitization as a source of liquid resources to fund new mortgages, rather than funding them through equity or deposits. The fraction of new loans sold, or securitized, in the securitization mortgage market during the first year of origination has steadily increased from around 50 percent in the 1990s to close to 80 percent in 2016, as shown in Figure 2. Table 1 reports that mortgage originators sell on average close to 70 percent of all mortgage loans they originate in a given year.

The high and positive correlation in the volume of issuance in both markets lends support to the idea of financially constrained mortgage originators. Expansions in demand for securities in the securitization market induce expansions of mortgage credit to households in the primary market because originators can securitize loans immediately after origination, which frees up resources to originate new loans. securitization market downturns represent a negative liquidity shock to originators; lower sales of mortgages and securities imply that originators must hold mortgages on their balance sheets for longer periods, which can induce contractions in new issuance of mortgages to households if banks do not hold enough capital or are unable to access other sources of funding.

GSEs have played a major role in purchasing loans and issuing MBS. Following the Great Recession the private segment of the RMBS issuance market collapsed, as shown in the right panel of

Figure 2: Fraction of mortgage sales



Source: HMDA. The fraction of sales corresponds to the cross-sectional average aggregate dollar amount of mortgage sales divided by the aggregate dollar amount of lending for a mortgage reporter institution, for loans originated within the year that are reported. Large reporters are institutions reporting more than 1,000 new mortgage loans every year.

Figure 1, effectively increasing the market share of GSEs to cover the entire market.

Table 1: Selected statistics

Mortgage market	90-06	09-16	90-16
Sales of loans ¹ (%)	61.8	77.0	66.7
Corr ² (sales, lending)	0.96	0.98	0.97
GSEs market shares ³	90-06	09-16	90-16
Loan purchases	0.62	0.74	0.66
RMBS issuance ⁴	0.69	0.95	0.81

Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2016. 1: The percentage of sales corresponds to the average dollar amount of loan sales divided by the total dollar amount of loans originated in a year by a mortgage-reporter institution. 2: The correlation reported is the average correlation of the volume of loans originated and of sold(or securitized) in the cross section. 3: Data on RMBS issuance market share are from SIFMA. 4: Data on RMBS issuance market share are only available starting in 1996.

Fluctuations of aggregates in the mortgage market are negatively correlated with fluctuations in households' default risk, which depends on households' fundamentals, namely, fluctuations in the value of the collateral—induced by house prices—and households' income. I perform a dynamic panel data estimation to document that the volume of mortgage lending and the volume of

mortgage sales in the securitization market at the level of the originating institution are negatively associated with aggregate measures of households' default rate on their mortgage obligations, as well as households' aggregate disposable personal income. Table 10 and Table 11 in Appendix B show these results. I include controls for originating institution asset's size and funding costs, which have the predicted sign.

2.2 Market Concentration

A high market concentration is the main characteristic of the mortgage industry in the United States. From 1990 to 2016, a small number of mortgage originators—although different over time—has dominated the lending market. Table 2 summarizes average moments that describe the cross-sectional distribution of mortgage originators based on their dollar amount of lending.¹⁰ On average over the period of analysis, the top 1 percent of mortgage originators accounted for 62 percent and the top 10 percent for 89 percent of mortgage lending in the market.¹¹ Concentration is even higher if the definition of loan origination is based on the sources of funds, that is, the retail and the wholesale channel. Stanton et al. (2014) find that the top 40 bankers accounted for 96 percent of all residential mortgage origination in 2006 when using Inside Mortgage Finance data and a definition of loan origination based on an originator's funding channel. Hence, the HMDA estimates in Table 2 represent a lower bound for the levels of concentration observed in the mortgage market.

Figure 12 in Appendix B shows that starting in the mid-1990s, the market became progressively more concentrated, peaking at the height of the 2006 housing market boom and slightly decreasing following the aftermath of the Great Recession. Another interesting observation is that the number of bankers has declined over time, going from more than 9,000 in the early 1990s to less than 6,000 by 2017. Most of the reduction in the number of originators is due to a reduction in the number of small banks and credit unions reporting home mortgage lending activity, as shown by the two dotted lines of Figure 11 in Appendix B.¹²

¹⁰These results are very similar if one restricts the set of loans to those that are home purchase, conventional, one-to-four family property, and owner-occupied.

¹¹This observation also holds when breaking down originators by type of mortgage institutions. A small fraction of banks and thrifts and mortgage companies issue the bulk of mortgages in the market, see Table 12 in Appendix B.

¹²This is consistent with the findings of Corbae and D'Erasmus (2013), McCord and Prescott (2014), and Janicki and Prescott (2006), who document a decline in the number of commercial banks and an increase in the market concentration of large banks as the main trends in the commercial banking industry during the last three decades.

Table 2: Moments of the distribution of mortgage lending

Moments	90-06
Market share top 1%	0.62
Market share top 10%	0.89
Market share top 25%	0.96
Lending top 10% to bottom 90%	9.22
Mean/median	18.5
Average number of institutions	8,596

Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel, 1990-2006

Sources of Funding

Based on their sources of funding, mortgage originators are categorized into two main groups: banks and savings institutions (including traditional banks, thrifts, and credit unions), which have access to deposits, and mortgage companies, which do not. This breakdown is relevant because it is informative about originators' reliance on the securitization market as a source of capital, and their likelihood of being financially constrained in their ability to fund mortgage lending in the primary market when demand for mortgage-backed securities in the securitization market dries up.

Mortgage companies sources of funding depend crucially on the securitization market's demand for mortgage-backed securities. Their portfolio of mortgages represents a large fraction of their assets, whereas most of their liabilities are in the form of short-term liabilities—repurchase agreements and warehouse lines of credit with maturities commonly between 30 to 45 days—which limits their ability to delay mortgage sales. From 1990 to 2016, mortgage companies sold on average close to 90 percent of their portfolio within the first year of origination, see Figure 13 in Appendix B. Moreover, mortgage companies account for an important share of mortgage lending to households. Figure 12 in Appendix B shows that their market share averaged 30 percent from 1990 to 2006 and has steadily increased since then, surpassing 50 percent in 2016.

Banks, on the other hand, have the option to hold mortgages for longer periods than mortgage companies according to their balance sheet capacity. If the demand in the securitization market dries up, they can still meet borrowers' demand for credit in the primary market by drawing from other sources of funding. However, there is evidence that many banks that operate in the mortgage market also behave like financially constrained institutions. [Loutskina and Strahan \(2009\)](#) and [Loutskina \(2011\)](#) use call-report data to show that securitization enhances bank lending potential but also makes a bank vulnerable to a shutdown of the securitization market, which induces a strong

contraction in their provision of credit. [Calem et al. \(2013\)](#) argue that the collapse in the private segment of the securitization market removed a major source of funding for banks. In response to this collapse, financially constrained banks reduced the supply of mortgages, thereby amplifying the response of lending growth to the liquidity shock experienced during the Great Recession.¹³ Based on these observations, in the model that I present in section 3, bankers are assumed to have limited access to outside equity.

3 The Model

3.1 Environment

Time is discrete and infinite. There are three types of agents: a continuum of borrowers of mass one, a continuum of bankers of mass one, and a government. I assume borrowers' discount factor $\beta > \beta^B$, where β^B is the discount factor of bankers.

Borrowers

Preferences and endowments. Each member of the borrower family is indexed by i and has preferences over a final numeraire consumption good, c_t , and over the housing services from owning housing stock, h_t :

$$u(c_t; h_t) = (1 - \alpha) \log c_t + \alpha \log h_t;$$

where α represents the valuation of housing services relative to other non-housing consumption goods. Each member receives the same stochastic income endowment y_t every period. It is assumed that the family provides perfect insurance against idiosyncratic shocks so each member at the beginning of every period owns the same amount of housing stock h_t s.t. $\int_0^1 h_t di = H_t$ and the same stock of liabilities or mortgage debt b_t s.t. $\int_0^1 b_t di = B_t$.

Mortgage Loans. Mortgages are modeled as long-term debt contracts with a fixed-rate and perpetual geometrically declining payments. This assumption is motivated by the fact that the most prominent mortgage contract in the United States is the fixed-rate 30 year mortgage. Under this type of contract, a fraction δ of the remaining principal balance becomes due each period, so that the next period's principal balance and payment decay by a factor $(1 - \delta)$. New mortgage loans n_t follow the same structure and accumulate every period according to the aggregate law of motion of outstanding loans given by (1). All new loans are priced competitively at the discounted

¹³This is also consistent with patterns in the securitization market of corporate loans documented by [Ivashina and Scharfstein \(2010\)](#). They find that during downturns, *lead banks* are required to hold larger shares of the loans they originate, which is associated with reductions in the amount of loans banks are willing to originate. The authors argue that this pattern is expected from financially constrained institutions.

price q_t , so that at origination, a banker gives the borrower q units of the numeraire good, and in exchange the banker receives a stream of payments $(1 - \delta)^{s-1}$ at time $t + s$.¹⁴

Mortgage Default. After having received their income endowment, each member of the borrower family draws an idiosyncratic housing depreciation shock $\theta_t^i \sim G_i(\cdot)$ which proportionally lowers the value of the house to $\theta_t^i p_{h,t} h_{t-1}$ with $\theta_t^i \in [0, 1]$.¹⁵ Then, each member optimally decides whether or not to default on the mortgages she holds according to the default function $d_t^i : [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. When a borrower defaults on its mortgage it also loses her stock of housing good h , so that default does not represent a windfall. This captures the loss of housing equity that a borrower experiences upon default by entering into foreclosure.¹⁶ Given that borrowers act as a family with perfect insurance they all have the same allocations except for their mortgage default decisions. Appendix E.1 shows that after aggregation the optimal default decision is characterized by a threshold θ_t , such that only borrowers with $\theta_t^i < \theta_t$ default on their mortgages. For a given threshold θ_t we can define the aggregate default rate across the representative family of borrowers $D_t(\theta_t) = \int_0^{\theta_t} g_i(\theta) d\theta$.

The maturity structure and the aggregate default rate imply the following law of motion for the stock of outstanding loans in the economy:

$$B_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)(1 - D_t)B_t + N_t \quad (1)$$

Notice that going forward, a loan originated $t - 1$ periods in the past has exactly the same payoff structure as another loan originated $t^0 > t$ periods in the past. Thus, we only need to keep track of total loans B , which reduces the number of state variables.¹⁷

Borrowers' Recursive Problem. The endogenous states that characterize the problem of the

¹⁴This representation has the advantage that the face value of all the coupon payments is $F_t = \sum_{s=0}^T (1 - \delta)^s = 1$. Furthermore, after making the first coupon payment δ , the amount of outstanding debt remaining next period is $F_{t+1} = \sum_{s=1}^T (1 - \delta)^s = 1 - \delta$.

¹⁵Similar to [Elenev et al. \(2016\)](#), the first and second moments of the housing depreciation shock, mean $\theta_t = E[\theta_t^i]$ and standard deviation $\sigma_{\theta,t} = \text{Var}[\theta_t^i]^{\frac{1}{2}}$, are assumed to vary over time. $\theta_{i,t}$ represents mortgage credit risk in the economy and it's assumed an exogenous state variable in the model.

¹⁶We abstract from other consequences of default for a borrower like reputation concerns and its effects to access credit over the long-term.

¹⁷Lelan (1994), Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), and Bianchi and Mondragon (2018) use this representation of long-term debt contract structure to model sovereign foreign debt.

borrower family are $fB;Hg$. The recursive formulation is:

$$V(B_t; H_t; X_t) = \max_{fC_t; N_t; H_{t+1}; !g} u(C_t; H_t) + {}^B E_{X^j X} V(B_{t+1}; H_{t+1}; X_{t+1}) \quad (2)$$

$$C_t + p_{h;t} H_{t+1} = Y_t + T_t^B + ! (t_t) p_{h;t} H_t - (1 - (t_t)) B_t + q_t N_t \quad (3)$$

$$B_{t+1} = (1 - (t_t)) (1 - (t_t)) B_t + N_t$$

$$B_{t+1} \leq p_{h;t} H_{t+1} \quad (4)$$

$$N_t \geq 0; H_{t+1} \geq 0 \text{ given } fB_0; H_0g:$$

where

$$(t_t) = \sum_{j=0}^J g_j d_j$$

$$! (t_t) = E[!_{i;t} | i;t \quad t;]$$

The borrower family's problem consist in choosing sequences of consumption, housing, and new mortgage debt $fC_t; H_{t+1}; N_tg$ to maximize lifetime utility subject to their budget set. Equation (3) represents the borrower family's budget constraint. T^B represents a state contingent lump-sum tax imposed on borrowers by the government to balance its budget. The outstanding mortgage debt is the sum of the remaining mortgage debt after default and new borrowing N_t . The borrowing constraint (4) restricts the total amount of debt B_{t+1} at the end of the period to a fraction of the new level of housing stock next period H_{t+1} .

Notice that mortgage default affects borrowers in three ways: first, it reduces current mortgage payments $(1 - (t_t)) B_t$; second, it reduces the remaining stock of debt for borrowers in the aggregate; and third, it also reduces the current aggregate stock of depreciated housing good since the function $! (t_t)$ represents the valuation of the houses of the mass of borrowers that repaid their mortgage.

Bankers

Preferences and Endowments. Bankers are denoted by lowercase letters with superscript j , and each banker j has preferences only over the final consumption good:¹⁸

$$u(c_t^j) = \log c_t^j:$$

¹⁸This formulation is equivalent to assuming a rigid housing demand by banker that derive services from a constant housing stock.

Banker j 's stock of loans is denoted by b_t^j . This is the only financial asset available to borrowers and bankers in this economy. Bankers receive cash payments from the fraction α of their stock of loans that matures every period.

Loan Origination Technology. At the beginning of each period t , a banker draws a loan-origination cost z_t^j , which distributes z $i.i.d.$ across bankers with a continuous cumulative distribution function $F(z)$ in a bounded support $[z_a; z_b]$. The loan origination technology is linear, and each banker j originates new loans of size n_t^j at a gross cost of $n_t^j z_t^j$. This stochastic cost represents a source of idiosyncratic risk for each banker that captures the heterogeneity in costs, lending opportunities, and expertise of a wide variety of institutions participating in the mortgage market.

Private Information. I assume that each banker holds a diversified portfolio of the mortgages extended to all borrowers. Consequently, the aggregate default rate (τ_t) across the family of borrowers applies equally to the portfolio of each banker. The private information friction rests on the ability of banker j to identify which of the loans within her portfolio b_t^j are non-performing in the current period, an outsider cannot make such distinction. The interpretation is that that after knowing her loan-origination cost each banker observes the aggregate default rate among borrowers and knows which loans within her portfolio are non-performing. By the end of the period this information becomes public and every banker can identify the non-performing loans in the economy. Additionally, it is also assumed that a banker's loan-origination cost z_t^j remains private so that other bankers cannot infer her actions.

Securitization Market. There is a securitization market where bankers can sell their stock of outstanding loans and buy securities. A banker makes trading decisions $f^j s_{G,t}^j; s_{B,t}^j; d_t^j g$ where $s_{G,t}^j$ represents banker's j sales of good-standing loans, that is those not affected by the default rate, $s_{B,t}^j$ represents sales of non-performing loans, and d_t^j represents purchases of securities. The securitization process consist in pooling loans to form securities. Hence, a security is a representative bundle of all loans traded in the market. The market is assumed to be non-exclusive and anonymous. Non-exclusivity implies that all loans and securities trade at the same pooling price ρ_t .¹⁹ Anonymity implies that buyers and sellers cannot identify each other.²⁰ Notice that because bankers can privately identify non-performing loans from good-standing loans they can selectively sell each type $f^j s_{B,t}^j; s_{G,t}^j g$. However, an outsider does not observe the quality of the loan sales, but only the total amount sold in the securitization market $s_{B,t}^j + s_{G,t}^j$.

¹⁹Securitization can be modeled in different ways; this particular way resembles characteristics of the to-be-announced market (TBA). The TBA market is a forward market in which investors trade promises to deliver MBS at fixed dates one, two, or three calendar months in the future.

²⁰This assumption is a tractable way of ensuring the adverse selection problem persist over time. Chari et al. (2014) shows that adverse selection can persist over time even when bankers have reputational concerns.

Recursive Problem of a Banker

The set of individual endogenous states that characterize the problem of a banker j is $f(b_t^j; z_t^j)g$. The recursive representation is the following:

$$V(b_t^j; z_t^j; X_t) = \max_{f; c_t; b_{t+1}; d_t; s_{G,t}; s_{B,t}g} u(c_t^j) + \mathbb{E}_{X_{t+1}|X_t} V(b_{t+1}^j; z_{t+1}^j; X_{t+1}) \quad (5)$$

$$c_t^j + z_t^j n_t(q_t + \delta_t) + p_t d_t^j (1 - \delta_t) = (1 - \delta_t) b_t^j + p_t (s_{G,t}^j + s_{B,t}^j) \quad (6)$$

$$b_{t+1}^j = (1 - \delta_t)(1 - \delta_t) b_t^j + s_{G,t}^j + n_t^j + (1 - \delta_t) d_t^j \quad (7)$$

$$n_t^j \geq 0, \quad d_t^j \geq 0 \quad (8)$$

$$s_{G,t}^j \geq 0, \quad s_{B,t}^j \geq 0 \quad (9)$$

$$\text{given } b_0^j > 0:$$

Equation (6) describes the banker's flow of funds constraint. The right hand side shows the sources of funding for banker j : (i) mortgage payments due this period after taking into account losses from borrowers' default, and (ii) cash receipts from sales of good-standing and non-performing loans in the securitization market at pooling price p_t . The left hand side shows banker j 's outflows: consumption c_t^j , origination of new loans n_t^j at discounted price q_t using her idiosyncratic origination cost z_t^j , and security purchases d_t^j in the securitization market.

Equation (7) represents the banker's law of motion of her portfolio of loans. The next period's portfolio is given by the outstanding loans $(1 - \delta_t)(1 - \delta_t) b_t^j$, plus new originated loans n_t^j , plus new purchases of securities d_t^j . The term $(1 - \delta_t)$ takes into account that a fraction δ_t of securities turns out to have low value because of the adverse selection problem present in the securitization market. Notice that $s_{B,t}^j$ does not show up in the law of motion of the banker's portfolio. This is because non-performing loans are assumed to have a recovery value of zero; if a banker decides to keep those loans, they are simply assumed as losses and taken off the books, but they don't accumulate to next period's portfolio. However, $s_{B,t}^j$ shows up today in the budget constraint because a banker can sell non-performing loans in the securitization market before everyone in the economy identifies their quality.

The last restrictions correspond to the non-negativity over origination, purchases, and restrictions over the amount of loans a banker can sell. The terms $f; p_t(X); q_t(X); \delta_t(X)g$ are equilibrium objects, here we make explicit their dependence on the aggregate states of the economy denoted by X_t . The term $\delta_t(X)$ is known in the literature as the adverse selection discount. It corresponds to the aggregate fraction of non-performing loans traded in the securitization market, that is those with a

zero payoff. Lastly, $f_t(X); \tau_t(X); T_t^B(X)g$ are state-contingent government policy tools, explained below.

Government

In the U.S. mortgage-backed securities market, the GSEs insure loans against default risk and finance this insurance by charging a fee to the originator, known as the guarantee fee. The fee is a surcharge, in basis points, added to the loan interest rate contracted with the borrower.

I model government interventions as a set of exogenous state-contingent policies. There are two policy instruments: (i) a fee (or tax) on loan originators and (ii) a subsidy (state contingent compensation) to bankers that buy securities. Let τ_t represent the insurance fee in units of the discounted price for loans. Then a banker must give up $\tilde{q}_t = q_t + \tau_t$ in order to lend a unit of resources to a borrower.

The subsidy on security purchases is denoted by $\tau_t > 0$. It is aimed at compensating buyers of securities for the losses derived from borrower's default and the adverse selection problem captured by the function Γ_t . It naturally follows to set $\tau_t = \alpha_t \tau_t^G$, where $\alpha_t \in [0; 1]$ corresponds to the degree of compensation provided by the government policy. When $\alpha_t = 1$, the policy completely offsets buyer's losses associated to default risk and adverse selection, in this sense, τ_t can be interpreted as an insurance. When $\alpha_t = 0$, there is no government intervention. The government budget constraint is given by

$$\tau_t N_t + T_t^B = \rho_t \int_Z d_t^j d\Gamma_t(b; z): \quad (10)$$

$\tau_t N_t$ represents aggregate government revenue from collecting the origination fee. T_t^B is a lump-sum tax charged to borrowers so that the government balances its budget each period. The right-hand side represents government expenditures from providing subsidy τ_t in the securitization market.

Aggregate Resource Constraint

The aggregate resource constraint is:

$$C_t + \int_Z c_t^j d\Gamma_t(b; z) + p_{h,t} H_{t+1} = (1 + r_t) p_{h,t} H_t + (N_t) Y_t: \quad (11)$$

where $(N_t) = q_t \int_Z (z_t^j - 1) n_t^j d\Gamma_t(b; z)$ represents the aggregate cost of lending in the economy and $\Gamma_t(b; z)$ represents the aggregate joint distribution of the stock of loans and origination costs across bankers in the economy.

State Variables

Let X_t denote the set of aggregate states in the economy. Then $X_t = \{f_t; Y_t; \Gamma_t; B_t; H_t\}$. Where $f_t; Y_t$ are the exogenous aggregate states. $\Gamma_t(b; z)$ is the joint distribution of the stock of loans and bankers' origination costs.²¹ $B_t; H_t$ are the aggregate stock of loans and the aggregate stock of housing good in the economy, respectively.

3.2 Competitive Equilibrium

A recursive competitive equilibrium given government policy $\{f(X); p(X); T^B(X)\}$ consists of the following functions: prices $\{q(X); p(X)\}$, adverse selection discount $\lambda(X)$, allocations for borrowers $\{c; n; b^l; h^l\}$, and allocations for bankers $\{c^j; n^j; d^j; s_G^j; s_B^j; g_j; z_j\}$ such that given initial endowments $\{b_0; b_0^j; g_j; z_j\}$, a law of motion $\Gamma^l(X)$, its transition density $\Pi(X^l|X)$, and value functions $\{V^B; V^j; g_j; z_j\}$:

1. Borrowers' allocations solve the problem in (28), taking as given $\{q(X); p(X)\}$.
2. bankers' allocations solve the problem in (5), taking as given $\{q(X); p(X); \lambda(X)\}$.
3. The price of loans $q > 0$ clears the credit market:

$$N(q; p; X) = \int n(q; p) d\Gamma; \quad (12)$$

4. Whenever $\rho > 0$, the securitization market clears:

$$D(\rho; q; X) = S(\rho; q; X); \quad (13)$$

and the adverse selection discount $\lambda(X)$ is determined in equilibrium by

$$\lambda(X) = \frac{S_B(\rho; q; X)}{S(\rho; q; X)}; \quad (14)$$

5. The law of motion of Γ is consistent with banker's individual decisions:

$$\Gamma^l(b; z) = \int_{b^l(\hat{b}; \hat{z}; X)}^z d\Gamma(\hat{b}; \hat{z}) F(z);$$

6. The government budget constraint holds:

$$N + T^B = \rho \int d \Gamma(b; z);$$

²¹In the presence of aggregate shocks, market-clearing prices change every period; thus households need to forecast prices. The distribution becomes a state variable because prices are a function of aggregates, which are computed by integrating the joint distribution.

7. The resource constraint holds

$$C^B + C^L + p_{h,t}H^0 - (1+r)p_{h,t}H + (1+r)N = Y:$$

The notation for aggregates in the securitization market is as follows: S_G denotes the aggregate supply of good-standing loans, S_B the aggregate supply of non-performing loans, and S the aggregate supply of all loans sold. Each of these objects is defined by

$$S_G(X) = \int_Z s_G(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z)$$

$$S_B(X) = \int_Z s_B(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z)$$

$$S(X) = S_G + S_B;$$

and let D denote the demand of loans:

$$D(X) = \int_Z d(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z)$$

4 Theoretical Analysis

This section first presents the characterization of banker's decisions and derives some results useful to understand the properties of the model. Then, we study the main properties of the model, by focusing on the mechanism by which information and financial frictions amplify and transmit shocks between the primary and securitization markets.

4.1 Characterization of a Banker's Decisions

The dynamic problem in equation (5) has characteristics that allows for a closed form characterization of banker's decisions, as shown by Kurlat (2013).²² I follow Kurlat's strategy and reproduce similar results. First, I show that all bankers' policy functions are linear in their stock of loans b . Second, I show that given choices of c and b^0 , decisions $(c; d; S_G; S_B)$ are obtained by solving a linear problem that leads to corner solutions. Third, I transform the problem of the bankers into a relaxed problem that allows for a simple characterization of consumption-lending decisions, and for deriving analytical expressions for the aggregate demand and supply of securities in the securitization market. Fourth, I show how the dynamics in the securitization market are connected

²²The main difference in the present environment with respect to Kurlat's, is that bankers must also take into account the price of loans q in their policy functions.

to the primary market and borrowers' decisions. From here on, I suppress the subscript j and time indexing for ease of notation. Also, I develop this section without including government's policy, since it is not relevant for the characterization that follows.

Aggregate States

Aggregate states X follow a joint distribution $\Theta(X) = \Theta(\tilde{c}; Y; \Gamma; B; H)$ with law of motion $\Theta^0(X^0) = \int_{\mathbb{R}} \Pi(X^0|X) d\Theta(X)$, where $\Pi(X^0|X)$ is the transition density associated with the law of motion. Additionally, the law of motion of Γ needs to be consistent with individual decisions $\Gamma^0(b; z)(X) = \int_{b^0(b; z; X)} d\Gamma(\tilde{b}; \tilde{z})$.

Under the assumption that $z = \{z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ across bankers, the joint distribution of debt holdings and idiosyncratic shocks $\Gamma(b; z)$ at time t can be written as the product of the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks F and the distribution of stock of loans G across bankers: $\Gamma(b; z) = G(b)F(z)$. This means that the stock of a banker's loans does not affect the probability of obtaining a particular realization of z . Furthermore, assuming that $z = \{z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ across time implies that z does not correlate with $\tilde{c}; Yg$: Then $\Theta(\tilde{c}; Y^0; \Gamma^0; \tilde{c}; Y; \Gamma) = \Theta(\tilde{c}; Y^0; \Gamma^0; \tilde{c}; Y)$ and

$$\begin{aligned} \Theta(\tilde{c}; Y^0; \Gamma^0; \tilde{c}; Y) &= \int \Pi(\tilde{c}; Y^0; \tilde{c}; Y) \Gamma(b^0; z^0) \\ &= \int \Pi(\tilde{c}; Y^0; \tilde{c}; Y) G(b^0) F(z^0): \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the joint law of motion of aggregate states is determined by the product of the law of motion for the exogenous states and origination costs and endogenous states.

Linearity of Policy Functions

The recursive problem in equation (5) has two main properties: i) the constraint set is linear in the stock of loans b , and ii) preferences are homothetic, given the assumption $u(c) = \log(c)$. The first implies that a banker's consolidated wealth is proportional to her stock of loans; the second implies that her consumption and saving decisions are a constant fraction of her wealth. Hence, the policy functions for all bankers' decisions $\tilde{c}; b^0; S_G; S_B; dg$ are linear in their stock of loans b . This is summarized in Lemma 1.

Lemma 1. Aggregate debt B is a sufficient statistic to predict prices and aggregate quantities. In particular, these do not depend on the distribution of debt holdings across bankers only on aggregate debt B .

Furthermore, Lemma 1 implies that the minimum relevant set of states needed to predict aggregate debt holdings next period is $X = \tilde{c}; B; H; \tilde{c}; Yg$.

Origination and Trading Policy Functions

In the securitization market, trading decisions can be characterized separately from consumption and investment decisions $f; c; b^j; g$. Taking portfolio investment decisions b^j as given, the problem of banker j , equation (5), consists of maximizing consumption c by choosing $f; d; n; s_G; s_B; g$, which implies solving a linear problem. This can be seen by combining the budget constraint (6) and the law of motion of banker's portfolio (7), which together yields

$$c = (1 - \mu) b [(1 - \mu) z q] + s_B \rho + s_G [\rho - z q] - d [\rho - z q (1 - \mu)] - z q b^j$$

Since each banker j takes as given prices $f; p; q; g$ and the adverse selection discount μ , trading decisions are easily derived by comparing static payoffs. For sales of non-performing loans s_B : if $\rho > 0$ a banker has no incentive to keep a non-performing loan with zero recovery value. She chooses to sell all of them, hitting the corner in (9): $s_B = (1 - \mu) b$. The decision to sell good-standing loans s_G is based on how a banker's origination cost qz^j compares with the price of selling loans ρ . Taking into account portfolio constraint in (8) yields:


$$s_G = \begin{cases} (1 - \mu)(1 - \mu) b & \text{if } z < \frac{\rho}{q} \\ 0 & \text{if } z \geq \frac{\rho}{q} \end{cases}$$

The decision to purchase securities d depends on how a banker's origination cost qz^j compares with the effective cost of buying a security $\frac{\rho}{1 - \mu}$. Notice, a banker understands that she is buying a bundle of all the loans supplied in the securitization market, and because all participants have incentives to sell all their non-performing loans, a fraction μ of them default with a zero payoff. Consequently, the effective cost of buying securities, $\frac{\rho}{1 - \mu}$, is higher than the market price ρ :

$$d = \begin{cases} > 0 & \text{if } z > \frac{\rho}{q(1 - \mu)} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Figure 3 summarizes a bankers' trading decisions in the securitization market according to cutoffs $\frac{\rho}{q}; \frac{\rho}{q(1 - \mu)}$. The support for z is divided into three intervals.

Figure 3: Bankers' trading decisions in the securitization market



In equilibrium, bankers self-classify into three groups: sellers, holders, and buyers. Sellers are bankers with a low- z , $z \geq [z_a; p=q]$. They can originate new loans at a low cost, and because of this, they have incentives to sell their entire outstanding portfolio in the securitization market and use the proceeds to originate new ones. Buyers are bankers with a high- z , $z \geq (\frac{p=q}{1}; z_b]$. For them, originating new loans is very costly, the market allows them to buy loans from other bankers at a lower price—after considering the adverse selection discount—relative to their origination cost. Thus, they choose to buy instead of originating new loans. Holders are bankers that fall between the cutoffs, $z \geq [p=q; \frac{p=q}{1}]$. Given their origination cost, the market price is not high enough to induce them to sell good-standing loans, and due to the adverse selection discount, the price they must pay for buying a bundle of loans in the market is too high, so they don't buy neither sell good-standing loans. They remain with a large amount of illiquid resources and end up origination fewer loans at a high cost.

Lemma 2 summarizes trading and lending decisions for bankers. Trade in securitization markets is essentially an alternative investment technology to loan origination. When the securitization market is active, some bankers can specialize in originating loans and others in holding existing securities, meaning that they find it profitable to invest through the market instead of investing using their own technology. If the securitization market is not active, this alternative technology is not available to any banker. Consequently, all bankers invest according to their idiosyncratic draw of origination cost z .

Lemma 2. Given a banker's savings b^j , if there exists a positive market price for loans $p > 0$, the optimal trading decisions $f_n; d; s_G; s_B$ are shown in Table 3

Table 3: Trading and lending decisions

	$z < p=q$	$z \geq [p=q; \frac{p=q}{1}]$	$z > \frac{p=q}{1}$
d	0	0	$\frac{b^j (1 - \frac{p=q}{1})(1 - \frac{p=q}{1})}{1} b$
s_G	$(1 - \frac{p=q}{1})(1 - \frac{p=q}{1}) b$	0	0
s_B	$(1 - \frac{p=q}{1}) b$	$(1 - \frac{p=q}{1}) b$	$(1 - \frac{p=q}{1}) b$
n	b^j	$b^j (1 - \frac{p=q}{1})(1 - \frac{p=q}{1}) b$	0

If there is no positive price that clears the securitization market, trading decisions are $d = s_G = s_B = 0$, and a banker origination decision is $n = b^j (1 - \frac{p=q}{1}) b$, taking into account the non-negativity constraints $n \geq 0$ and $d \geq 0$.

Consumption and Investment Policy Functions

Different trading decisions imply different budget sets for a banker. In particular, the budget set for bankers that decide either to buy or to hold is not convex. This non-convexity arises because the marginal rates of substitution are not only different across bankers but also different between possible equilibrium outcomes in the securitization market. In this environment, [Kurlat \(2013\)](#) shows that it is possible to characterize consumption-investment policy functions by defining an extended convex budget set that captures a banker's virtual wealth before trading decisions. This approach allows for (i) setting up a relaxed problem for any banker type j and deriving consumption-investment policy rules as functions of an agent's virtual wealth before the realization of the agent's idiosyncratic origination cost Z , and (ii) an analytical characterization of the aggregate supply and demand in the securitization market.

Furthermore, the solution to the relaxed problem coincides with the solution of the original problem whenever the securitization market for loans is active. That is, there is a positive price ρ that clears the market. If there is no such positive price, the relaxed problem can also be used to obtain consumption-investment policy functions without trade in the securitization market.

A banker's virtual wealth is defined as

$$W(b; z; X) = b(1 - \alpha) + (1 - \alpha)\rho + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \alpha)q \max\{f\rho = q; \min\{fZ; \frac{\rho = q}{1}gg\} : \quad (15)$$

The virtual wealth represents a banker's consolidated wealth as a generic function of her origination cost Z , prices f, q, ρ, g , and lending and trading decisions $f, n; d; S_G; S_B, g$. It consolidates the banker's sources income: cash payments from her maturing portfolio, cash from selling non-performing loans, and the virtual valuation of her outstanding portfolio of loans—at either the market price or at the banker's internal valuation rate. Using (15) we can define a convex budget set that is weakly larger than the original budget set in problem (5). The problem of a banker under this relaxed budget set is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V(b; z; X) &= \max_{f, c; b^l, g} \log(c) + \mathbb{E}_{X^0 | X} V(b^l; z^l; X^l) \\ & s.t: \\ & c + b^l q \min\{fZ; \frac{\rho = q}{1}g\} \leq W(b; z; X): \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

Given the choice of banker's utility function, the optimal consumption-investment decision rule will be to invest a constant fraction α of his wealth and consume the rest. Lemma 3 presents the policy functions for a banker j as a function of her virtual wealth.

Lemma 3. The optimal consumption and investment policy functions that solve problem (16) are given by:

$$c = (1 - \beta) W(b; z; X) \quad (17)$$

$$b^j = \frac{\beta}{q \min\{fz, \frac{p-q}{1}\} g} W(b; z; X). \quad (18)$$

Equilibrium in the Securitization Market

The supply of loans in the securitization market is obtained by integrating the policy functions of sales of good-standing loans and non-performing loans, presented in Lemma 2, across the distribution of bankers:²³

$$\begin{aligned} S(p; q; X) &= S_B(X) + S_G(X) \\ &= \int s_B(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) + \int s_G(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\ &= B(1 - \beta) [1 + (1 - \beta) F(p=q)]. \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

The adverse selection discount defined by equation (14) can be expressed as:

$$(p; q; X) = \frac{1}{1 + (1 - \beta) F(p=q)}. \quad (20)$$

Demand for loans is obtained by integrating security purchases. For this we use the banker's investment policy function (18) and purchasing decisions from Lemma 2:

$$\begin{aligned} D(p; q; X) &= \int d(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\ &= \int_{z_b}^z \int_{\frac{p-q}{1} b}^z \frac{b^j (1 - \beta)(1 - \beta) b}{1} dG(b) dF(z) \\ &= B(1 - \beta) F \frac{p-q}{1} (1 - \beta) \frac{1}{p} + \frac{1}{1} + (1 - \beta) \frac{(1 - \beta)(1 - \beta)}{1}. \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

Notice that demand is only well defined for $\beta < 1$; when $\beta = 1$ demand is zero. Market clearing requires that

$$S(p; q; X) = D(p; q; X) \text{ holding strict whenever } p > 0. \quad (22)$$

Lemma 4. $D > 0$ only if the solutions to problem (5) and problem (16) coincide for all bankers.

The solutions to problem (5) and problem (16) will differ whenever a banker chooses an allocation outside her budget set in (5). In this case, demand for securities in the securitization market will be zero, and the price must also be zero.

²³Recall that z distributes $i.i.d$ across bankers with a continuous cumulative distribution function $F(z)$ in a bounded support $[z_a, z_b]$.

Equilibrium in the Primary Credit Market

Lemma 5. Credit supply in the primary credit market is contingent on the equilibrium outcome achieved in the securitization market. The credit supply function is given by

$$N^S(p; q; X) = \int_{z_a}^{z(p; q)} nd\Gamma(b; z): \quad (23)$$

where the cutoff $z(p; q)$ is given by

$$z(p; q) = \begin{cases} \frac{p-q}{1-(p-q)} & p > 0 \\ \min \{ z_b, \frac{1}{q} \frac{L}{(1-L)(1-\gamma)} g \} & p = 0 \end{cases}$$

The equilibrium in the primary market is determined by the market clearing condition (12), which equates borrower's demand for credit to bankers' supply of credit. The aggregate supply of credit is derived by aggregating the banker's lending decisions as given by Lemma 2. Lending policy functions are defined for two possible scenarios in the securitization market: one in which loans and securities trade at a strictly positive price; and another in which the price of these assets is zero. In the first case, only bankers that become sellers and holders originate new loans, and the total mass of originators is given by the integral over the interval $[z_a, \frac{p-q}{1-(p-q)}]$, see Figure 3. Hence, when the securitization market is active the total supply of credit is given by (23). In the second case, when the securitization market is not active, aggregate supply will be given by the integral of lending decisions over all bankers in the interval $[z_a, Z(q)]$, where $Z(q) = \min \{ z_b, \frac{1}{q} \frac{L}{(1-L)(1-\gamma)} g \}$.

The aggregate demand for credit depends on the policy function of aggregate debt $B^0(B; H; X)$, which is obtained by numerically solving problem (28). Once we solve borrower's problem we derive the aggregate demand for credit using the law of motion for borrower's aggregate debt:

$$N^D(q; X) = B^0(B; H; X) \quad (1 - (t))(1 - \gamma)B: \quad (24)$$

Market clearing in the primary market satisfies

$$N^D(q; X) = N^S(p; q; X): \quad (25)$$

Notice that the price of securities in the securitization market also affects the market clearing equilibrium condition in the primary lending market.

The model is fully characterized by the solution to the problem of the family of borrowers (28); the policy functions for each individual banker problem (17)-(18); the market clearing conditions for each market (12)-(13); and the aggregate resource constraint of the economy (11). Equilibrium prices $f(p(X); q(X))g$ for state space X , and borrower's policy functions are jointly solved using global solution methods. The computational algorithm is presented in Appendix D.

4.2 Model Properties

The Role of the Securitization Market

The securitization market serves two primary purposes in the economy: first, it provides additional liquidity to bankers and, second, it allows for an efficient reallocation of resources among bankers.

A banker can obtain liquidity by selling—partially or completely—her portfolio of outstanding loans instead of collecting payments until portfolio’s maturity. Without a securitization market to trade these illiquid assets the liquidity available to a banker every period is limited to the cash payments from the banker’s maturing portfolio.

The reallocation resources among bankers occurs because of bankers’ heterogeneous valuation of their outstanding portfolio.²⁴ The most efficient bankers—those hit with a low Z —have a low valuation of their outstanding portfolio and want to sell it because they can invest at a higher return by origination new loans. The least efficient bankers—those hit by a high Z —have a high valuation of their outstanding portfolio because originating new loans is expensive. For them holding illiquid assets through the purchase of securities is a more profitable strategy. In this sense, the securitization market allows the reallocation of illiquid assets from low- Z bankers to high- Z bankers. In equilibrium, a mass of bankers invest by originating new loans, and another invest by buying securities.²⁵

In this economy credit intermediation is a costly process. By accessing a securitization market, bankers can trade away their differences in intermediation costs and reduce their individual cost of investment. Now, since bankers consume and invest in fixed proportions, a fraction of those extra resources—gained through an efficient reallocation—increases their investment. In the aggregate, higher investment is reflected in an expansion of the credit supplied to borrowers. Thus, by increasing liquidity and facilitating the reallocation of resources, the securitization market also reduces the aggregate cost of lending, which translates into lower interest rates to borrowers. This is summarized in Proposition 1.

Proposition 1 *Under complete information, in the steady state, an economy with trade in the Securitization Market features lower mortgage rates than in the absence of trade this market, i.e. the discounted price of mortgage debt satisfies: $q^{CI} > q^{NSM}$.*

²⁴The assumption of idiosyncratic shocks generates heterogeneity in origination costs and introduces motives for trade among bankers.


²⁵This specialization by activity captures the specialization observed in the mortgage market, that is, some financial institutions specialize in issuing loans but while others specialize in holding and investing in mortgage-backed securities.

The Effect of Private Information

Information frictions reduce the extent to which bankers can trade by introducing a wedge between the price that a seller receives and the cost that a buyer faces. While a buyer pays p for a security, he only obtains 1 units. The impossibility of publicly identifying non-performing loans in the securitization market creates an adverse selection problem. Sellers are better informed about the quality of the loans they sell, and they use this information advantage on their benefit. By always selling the non-performing loans and retaining the good-standing loans, whenever the market price is below their valuation, sellers adversely affect buyers in the securitization market.

To isolate the effects of information frictions, consider the case of complete information: that is assume that all bankers in the economy can identify the loans affected by θ . Given that non-performing loans pay zero upon default with certainty, their market value is zero. In this case, there is no adverse selection in the securitization market, only good loans are traded at a price different from zero if there is a positive equilibrium price. Hence, the market discount from adverse selection is zero and there is no wedge between the price a banker received and the cost to a buyer from purchasing bundle of loans in the securitization market. Figure 4 shows bankers' decisions under complete information. There is only one cutoff, and trading and origination decisions are as before. All bankers with origination cost below Z sell their entire portfolio in the securitization market to obtain cash and originate new loans. All bankers with origination cost Z retain their portfolio, buy securities and do not originate new loans.

Figure 4: bankers' trading decisions under complete information



Proposition 1 states that the aggregate cost credit intermediation depends on the extent to which the reallocation of resources among bankers is carried over. In other words, information frictions reduce the level of trade achieved in the securitization market, which has implications for the level of credit supplied in the primary market and for the price of credit (interest rate) that borrowers face.

An important property of the model is that adverse selection in the securitization market becomes more severe when household default rates increase. This is because the average quality of loans

traded falls compared with the quality of loans retained in a banker's portfolio.²⁶ Notice that when the default rate is low, the effects of private information in disrupting trade can be small. However, as default rate shocks increase, the adverse selection problem becomes very acute, which can lead to a complete disruption of trade in securitization markets.

Comparative Statics

Here, I establish how aggregate shocks to the default rate affect aggregate outcomes in the securitization market and the credit market. First, let \hat{z} be a market cutoff in equilibrium $\hat{z} = \frac{p}{q}$.

Lemma 6. *The proportion of non-performing loans in the market (X) is a decreasing function of and \hat{z} .*

See Appendix E for the proof. Lemma 6 indicates that when the default rate is high, if there is an equilibrium price, which defines the cutoff \hat{z} , the proportion of non-performing loans in the market is high. Also, when the equilibrium price in the market is high (i.e., securities are highly valued), then the fraction of non-performing loans in the market is low. This is the case because if loans are traded at higher prices, more bankers sell their entire portfolio, which increases the fraction of good-standing loans and reduces the fraction of non-performing loans in the market.

Assumption A1: $\delta \hat{z} \geq [z_a; z_b]$:

$$m(\hat{z}) > \frac{1}{\hat{z}} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\delta} F(\hat{z}) \right)$$

where $m(\hat{z}) = \frac{F(\hat{z})}{F'(\hat{z})}$ is the Mills ratio or hazard rate of \hat{z} .

Lemma 7. *Under Assumption A1, the second equilibrium cutoff $\frac{\hat{z}}{1 - F(\hat{z})}$ is decreasing in \hat{z} .*

Lemma 7 states that as securitization market conditions improve, loans are traded at a high price (higher \hat{z}), and the cutoff that indicates the real price paid by buyers gets closer to the price the seller receives (first cutoff), in other words, the private information wedge is low. As explained before, this wedge represents the extent to which information frictions in the market impede trade. Thus, shocks that increase the value of loans in the securitization market attenuate the frictions imposed by private information.

Shocks that increase the default rate disrupt the functioning of the securitization market by increasing the proportion of non-performing loans, which follows from Lemma 6. A higher δ will,

²⁶Elul (2011) presents empirical support for this idea, finding that in 2005, the average quality of retained loans was not significantly different from that of loans sold, whereas starting in 2006, the average quality of loans sold worsened compared with those retained. Agarwal et al. (2012) also document that starting in 2007, the strategy of prime mortgage originators moved towards an unwillingness to retain higher-default-risk loans in return for a lower prepayment risk, which coincides with the beginning of the foreclosure crisis in the primary mortgage market.

in turn, increase the real cost of buying securities which contracts demand; that is the second cutoff $\frac{p=q}{1}$ moves to the right in Figure 5. Then, the price must fall in order for the securitization market to clear. Consequently, the volume of trade is lower because at a lower price, more bankers retain good-standing loans instead of selling them, i.e. more bankers become holders.

Proposition 2. *In steady state, consider a increase in the default rate such that $\theta_{ss} > \theta_{ss}$, then the economy transitions to a new steady state in which:*


In the securitization market,

1. *a higher proportion of non-performing loans are traded.*
2. *a lower volume of trade: sales of goodstanding loans and purchases.*
3. *lower price of securities.*

In the primary lending market,

1. *lower aggregate lending.*
2. *higher interest rate (lower discounted price of lending).*
3. *lower consumption of housing and non-durable goods by borrowers.*

Figure 5: Effects of episodes of high default



Furthermore, as explained in Section 4.2, the aggregate cost of lending increases when the default rate is high because a larger mass of holders originate new loans at a higher cost. In the primary market, borrowers' needs for credit also increases due to lower housing stock.

Corollary. *In steady state, there exists a threshold \tilde{z} such that for $\theta_{ss} > \tilde{\theta}$:*

1. *there is no trade in the securitization market, and each banker uses his own technology to originate new loans.*
2. *the aggregate cost of lending and the interest rate are higher compared to the case when the securitization market operates.*

In the presence of private information, the equilibrium in the securitization market is always achieved for values of β below a threshold β^* . Item 2 follows from Proposition 1 in Section 4.2.

5 Quantitative Analysis

5.1 Calibration

The model is calibrated at annual frequency for the period 1990-2006. The calibrated parameters are presented in Table 4.

Preferences Parameters. For borrowers, the discount rate β^B is set to 0.97 to match the ratio of consumption of non-durables and services to disposable personal income from the national income and product accounts (NIPA), which equals 0.79. The housing preference parameter β^H is set to 0.13 in order to match the ratio of borrowers' housing goods to non-durable consumption good $C=H$ to the ratio of the consumption of non-durables and services to the ratio of residential real estate 0.4 from NIPA. The parameter governing the borrowing constraint β^L is set to 0.425 to match the ratio of households' mortgage debt to the stock of residential real estate in the flow of funds accounts. For bankers, the discount rate β^L is set to 0.985 to match the average real risk-free rate obtained from a one-year Treasury bill, which is 1.6% for 1990-2006.²⁷

Technology Parameters. The distribution of lending cost shocks across bankers, $F(z)$, is calibrated using microdata from the HMDA database.²⁸ I aggregate the volume of mortgage origination in dollar amounts for every banker and for every year in the database from 1990 to 2017. Refer back to Table 2 for the average moments of the cross-sectional distribution. In order to match key moments of the lending distribution, $F(z)$ is modeled as a beta distribution characterized by shape parameters $(\alpha; \beta)$ in a bounded support $[Z_a; Z_b]$. Shape parameters $(\alpha; \beta)$ are estimated by methods of simulated moments to match the market share of the top 25 percent of originators, which is 0.96, and the ratio of the average volume of mortgage origination of the top 10 percent of originators to the bottom 90 percent in dollar amounts. The choice of moments is motivated by the analysis in Section 2.2. There, I argue that the main features of the cross-sectional distribution of lending are: (i) high concentration in the volume of lending among a small number of originators; and (ii) the volume of the top 10 percent of originators is about nine times that of the bottom 90 percent originators. The bounds in the support of the distribution $[Z_a; Z_b]$ are the result of calibrat-

²⁷In the model bankers do not have access to a risk-free bond; however, it is possible to compute the risk-free rate corresponding to a one period risk-free bond by computing the stochastic discount factor based on the aggregate consumption that the family of bankers obtains: $\frac{1}{1+r^f} = \beta^L E_{X^0|X} [U_{c^0} = U_c]$, where $U_c = \frac{1}{\int \sigma^d(b; z)}$.

²⁸The HMDA requires covered depository and non-depository institutions to collect and publicly disclose information about applications for, originations of, and purchases of home purchase loans, home improvement loans, and refinancing.

ing the scale, $sc = Z_b - Z_a$, and location, $lc = Z_a$; parameters. I normalize the scale sc to 1, and set the location parameter to match the average real mortgage rate of 5.3 percent for the period 1990-2006. The mortgage bond is characterized by parameter β , which governs the duration of the bond. I use the estimations from [Elenev et al. \(2016\)](#), who estimate this parameter by matching the duration and the coupon payments structure of a representative mortgage bond given by the Barclays MBS index.

Government Policy Parameters. The government's vector of policy instruments is given by $f; g$. The discounted price fee g is a time-varying function that satisfies

$$r^g(\tilde{q}_t) = r(q_t) - g_f;$$

where $r(q_t)$ is the interest rate implied by the discounted price q_t that borrowers face, and $r^g(\tilde{q}_t)$ is the net interest rate obtained by the banker after subtracting the guarantee fee. Using the definition of $\tilde{q} = q + g$, a relation between q and the g_f can be derived:

$$q = \tilde{q} - \frac{g_f}{1 + \tilde{q}};$$

I calibrate the guarantee fee, g_f , to 20 basis points, since this was the average for the period 1990 to 2006, as reported by Fannie Mae. The parameter governing the degree of subsidy in the securitization market, β , is set to the average market share of GSEs of all sales of mortgages in the securitization market, which was 69 percent for the period 1990 to 2006.

Aggregate Exogenous Processes. Borrower households' income Y and the variance of the depreciation shocks δ are the two exogenous aggregate states in the economy. To capture the negative correlation among these two variables present in the data, I assume they follow a first-order joint Markov process, characterized by state space $(Y_t; \delta_t) \in Y \times S$ and transition matrix Π . For income, I use the cyclical component of disposable personal income from the flow of funds account. The mean and the variance of the depreciation rate are calibrated to replicate the national delinquency rate for mortgage loans that are 90 or more days delinquent or went into foreclosure from the National Mortgage Database from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). I set $(H; L) = (5.7\%; 17.5\%)$ which obtains default rates $(H; L) = (1.8\%; 7.9\%)$ and unconditional default rate of 2.6%

5.2 Model's Fit

This section shows the model's performance in terms of targeted moments and non-targeted moments, and shows the results from a simulation with the same sequence of shocks, as observed during the Great Recession. [Table 4](#) shows the benchmark calibration and the targeted moments.

Table 4: Model vs Data Moments

Parameter	Target, period 1990-2006	Data	Model
Preferences			
L	0.985 risk free rate (%)	1.6	1.7
B	0.97 $C=Y$, consumption to disposable personal income	0.79	0.80
B	0.13 $C=K$, consumption to real estate stock	0.40	0.40
	0.03 $I=K$, residential real estate invest to real estate stock	0.03	0.035
	0.43 $B=K$, households mortgage debt to real estate stock	0.43	0.43
	0.21 Average maturity of mortgage bond index.	3.7	3.7
Bankers technology, $F(z)$			
	5.0 Market share top 25% originators	0.96	0.90
	2.0 Average lending top-10 to top-90	9.22	5.82
lc	0.63 r^m , Freddie Mac, 30Y FRM real (%)	5.34	4.57
sc	1.00 normalized to standard beta distribution	-	-
Government policy			
G	0.69 GSEs market share of mortgage sales in SM, 90-03 & 90-16		
g_f	20 Avg insurance fee (bps), Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae, 90-06		

The model fits the data reasonably well. In the primary market, the model does a good job in matching the market share of the top 25 percent originators in the cross-sectional distribution. In terms of non-targeted moments, Table 5 shows that in the securitization market, the model has a good fit with the correlation between the volume of sales and the volume of loan originations to households. However, the model predicts a higher fraction of loan sales in the securitization market than in the data and falls short in accounting for the value added of the credit intermediation sector. In general, the model has a good fit with the distribution of market shares in quartile groups across mortgage originators.


Table 5: Non-targeted moments. Model’s benchmark calibration

Description	Model	Data	Description. Period 90-06
Fraction of loan sales	0.79	0.62	% home mortg sold in SM, HMDA
Corr (sales, lending)	0.86	0.90	Time series, HMDA
mortgage spread (bps)	170	360	Avg 30y FRM compared to 10y t-bill.

Distribution of lending (%)				
Market share by quartile group	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Data	0.2	0.8	3.0	95.6
Model	0.0	0.1	8.9	90.0

Figure 6 shows the model’s implied distribution of lending costs across bankers. The cutoffs are obtained for the mean default rate and income shock. The density shows that there is a small mass of bankers that originate loans to households at a low cost—those below the first cutoff \hat{z} —and a large mass of bankers with high origination costs. According to the model, those bankers below the first cutoff sell their entire portfolio to take advantage of their low lending cost. This large inflow of cash allows them to issue a large number of new loans to households compared with those bankers that hold on to their portfolio of good-standing loans—the mass of bankers between the two cutoffs—which only originate new loans using the proceeds from the fraction of their portfolio that matures.

Figure 6: Distribution of lending cost and lending volumes across bankers



The left panel shows the implied density for $F(z)$ on the benchmark calibration. The right panel plots the volume of loan origination to households (y-axis) against the support of lending costs (x-axis).

In line with the patterns of the U.S. mortgage market, the calibration replicates a small mass of

bankers originating the majority of loans in this economy. The model predicts that the liquidity benefits of trading in the securitization market are large: the left panel in Figure 6 shows a large discontinuity in the volume of lending of the last marginal seller compared with the next marginal holder, about four times as large. Based on this market structure, the model predicts that fluctuations in the aggregate default rate induce changes in the distribution of sellers, holders, and buyers, which in turn induces large fluctuations in the supply of credit in the primary market. In particular, times in which the default rate is high result in large contractions of the volume of new loan originations because some of the most efficient bankers switch from selling to holding their portfolio. The degree of concentration plays a key role in the quantitative magnitude of the induced fluctuations.


5.3 Dynamic Responses

This section studies the model's predictions on aggregates in the mortgage market during the Great Recession. The baseline calibration corresponds to the period 1990-2006 as described in the previous section. A sequence of realized shocks for aggregate households' income; and a sequence of housing depreciation shocks that endogenously matches the default rate observed from 2006 to 2016 are fed into the model as exogenous processes. Figure 15 in Appendix B, shows the entire sequence since 2000.

The model accounts for two-thirds of the decline in the mortgage market during the Great Recession. Figure 7 shows percentage changes with respect to 2006. The volume of sales in the securitization market fell by 35 percent on average between 2006 and 2013, and the model predicts a decline of 20 percent during the same period. In the primary market, the volume of new issuance of mortgage loans also fell by 40 percent on average from 2006 to 2013. The model predicts a contraction of 25 percent during the same period.

Figure 17 shows percentage changes with respect to 2006 for two households' aggregates. The consumption of non-durables falls by 2 percent in 2009 and then dwindles until 2016 when it reaches 2006 levels. The model generates a decline of the same magnitude with a one-year lag. Consumption falls by 2 percent starting in 2010, stays down until 2013, and then slowly recovers to 2006 levels by the end of 2016. The model misses the dynamics of residential investment because housing can be immediately des-invested by households since there are no transaction costs in the model.

Figure 7: The mortgage market during the Great Recession



Panel a: Data is the aggregate volume of new mortgage issuance in a given year in dollar amounts. Source: HMDA database. Panel b: Data, Sales corresponds to the aggregate volume of sales of mortgage loans in the securitization market in a given year in dollar amounts. Source: HMDA database. All data series have been de-trended to 2015 prices.

5.4 Quantifying Information Frictions

How important are information frictions in the securitization market to account for fluctuations in aggregate credit? To answer this question, I simulate the model for the same sequence of aggregate shocks observed during the Great Recession for an economy under complete information. In this economy, non-performing loans are immediately identified by all lenders in the economy and hence are not traded in the securitization market. Still, security investors face aggregate default risk associated to the pool of loans that conform the security.

Figure 8: Shock Decomposition during the Great Recession




Figure 8 shows the shock decomposition for the both aggregates in the credit and securitization market. The bars quantifying the contribution of private information correspond to the difference between the benchmark economy and an economy with complete information, both with the same sequence of household’s income and housing valuation shocks. The quantification of the effect of exogenous shocks is obtained by turning-off one shock at time in an economy under complete information.

Panel (a) in Figure 8 shows that on average forty percent of the model’s predicted decline in mortgage lending arises from information frictions. Put differently, information frictions amplify the dry up of liquidity in the securitization market by almost double. Panel (b) shows that trading of securities would have remained at the levels observed previous to the Great Recession up until 2011.

Table 6: Average contribution of forces during 2008-2013

Contribution (pp)	priv. info	$\frac{?}{?}$	\mathcal{Y}
Credit Market	43	52	5
Securitization Market	46	50	4

Given that the model replicates two-thirds of the dynamics of mortgage credit, and given that information frictions account for forty percent of the model predicted contraction, in the aggregate, the decomposition shows that thirty percent of the credit contraction observed in the Great Recession can be attributed to the collapse of the securitization market.

5.5 Evaluation of Policies

After the Great Recession, two main changes took place in the securitization mortgage market. The first was the collapse of the private segment of the RMBS market in 2008, which effectively left in place only the agency segment, which I interpret as an expansion of the coverage ^G of the subsidy policy from 69 percent to 100. The second change was an increase in the guarantee fee charged by GSEs to mortgage originators for insuring RMBS investors against default risk. After 2012, this fee went up from 20 basis points to 60 basis points. Table 7 reports unconditional means and standard deviations for the main outcomes in the primary and securitization markets, and for government variables obtained from simulating the economy for 10,000 periods under each scenario. The first two columns correspond to moments obtained from simulations for the benchmark economy and simulations for an economy with both changes. The two decomposition columns report moments obtained by simulating economies with one change at a time.

Table 7: Policy changes after the Great Recession

Description	Benchmark	Δ^+	Δ^+	Δ^+ & Δ^+
<i>Primary Market</i>				
Mortgage spread (bps)	329	261	356	290
Mortgage spread, std (pp)	6.3	4.8	6.1	4.7
Default rate (pp)	2.7	3.2	2.6	3.0
<i>Securitization Market</i>				
Fraction of loans traded (pp)	85.1	100	85.7	100
Price of securities, std (pp)	11.3	9.2	11.3	9.2
Prob. of market collapse (pp)	6.3	0.0	6.1	0.0
<i>Government Policy</i>				
Costs of policy (pp), $= G$	6.8	6.5	6.5	2.8
Borrower's share of tax (pp)	29	39	0	15

[?]Moments obtained from simulating the model for a long time series (10,000 periods).

The model predicts that the policy changes introduced after the Great Recession are effective in stabilizing the mortgage market by reducing the volatility of quantities and prices in both primary and securitization markets compared with the benchmark economy. In the primary market, the volatility of the interest rate falls from 6.3 to 4.7 percentage points, reflecting higher stability in the mortgage rates faced by households. This magnitude of change is consistent with the observed decline in the volatility of the mortgage spread in the data, which fell by about 60 percent between periods 1990-2006 and 2013-2018, as shown in Table 17 in Appendix B.

In the securitization market, the volatility of the price of securities also falls substantially, declining from 11.3 in the benchmark economy to 9.2 percentages in the economy after both policy changes. The decomposition columns in Table 7 show that the reduction in the volatility of the mortgage rate spread and in the price of securities comes from increasing the subsidy. By completely compensating buyers for losses from default risk and adverse selection, the economy achieves its maximum level of trade at every realization of the aggregate states. This implies that all bankers classify as either sellers or buyers, and no bankers are left holding on to their portfolio of good-standing loans. Fluctuations in the default rate affect the supply of and demand for securities in the securitization market through the general equilibrium effect from borrowers' demand for new lending.

Overall, the model predicts that the mortgage spread settles slightly below the level of the benchmark economy. The increase in the subsidy implies a reduction in the interest rates by 70 basis points; this reduction comes from a more efficient reallocation of assets between bankers in the securitization market. Increasing the fee on originators pushes the mortgage spread up, and mortgage originators pass on part of the tax in the form of higher interest rates to households in the primary market.

A more stable mortgage market comes at the cost of higher taxes to both borrowers and bankers. The cost of expanding the government subsidy in the securitization market increases substantially from 6.8 cents on the dollar to 11.8 cents on the dollar. Raising taxes (fee) on originators reduces the tax burden on borrowers. Furthermore, it implies a lump-sum transfer to borrowers from lenders.

Table 8: Welfare effects: policy changes after Great Recession

Description	Δ^+ & Δ^+	Decomposition	
		Δ^+	Δ^+
$\Delta\%$ Borrower welfare	0.06	-0.16	0.18
$\Delta\%$ Non-durable cons.	-0.15	-0.69	0.47
$\Delta\%$ Housing good cons.	0.55	2.63	-1.89
$\Delta\%$ Bankers' welfare	1.3	3.01	-1.53

[?]Moments obtained from simulating the model for a long time series (10,000 periods).

Changes in welfare are in consumption-equivalent units.

A welfare analysis of the policy changes introduced after the Great Recession shows positive but unequal welfare gains among borrowers and bankers. Table 8 shows that the policy changes introduced after the Great Recession imply small welfare gains for borrowers and significant welfare gains for bankers. The decomposition shows that borrowers benefit from the lower interest rates and lower volatility. However, the increase in taxes subdues these welfare gains. For bankers, the gains from stabilization in the securitization market are higher because the subsidy policy has an additional benefit of improving lending efficiency, which reduces their lending costs and allows them to consume more. Here, it is important to keep in mind that I have modeled the government as having access to a limited set of policy tools. In particular, government expenditure is financed using non-distortionary taxes on borrowers, whereas the subsidy policy affects borrowers through changes in the interest rate (i.e., an intertemporal margin). It would be interesting to expand the set of government tools to taxes that affect other margins on households' decisions. Additionally, the capacity of the government to issue debt could smooth tax payments in aggregate states in which government expenditures are high because of higher default risk. Thus, having access to

debt could increase the welfare gains from policy interventions in the securitization market.

6 Conclusion

This paper develops a framework that connects dynamics in the lending and securitization mortgage markets in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I calibrated model to match main features of the U.S. mortgage market from 1990 to 2006. I find that liquidity and information frictions in the securitization market accounted for one third of the total mortgage credit contraction during the Great Recession. The model's success in generating large fluctuations in both markets rests on two important forces: (i) the severity of information frictions, and (ii) the concentration among loan originators in the U.S. mortgage market. A welfare analysis of the policy changes introduced in the securitization market after the Great Recession shows positive but unequal welfare gains among borrowers and bankers.

On the policy analysis, a substantial amount of research has focused on the moral hazard cost of expanding GSEs and finds little scope or no role at all for policy interventions. My analysis focuses on liquidity frictions arising from information problems—adverse selection in the securitization mortgage market—and shows that in the presence of this type of frictions, expanding government policy can have an important stabilization role in the mortgage market. In particular, this paper contributes by highlighting two aspects of the benefits of expanded government policy: the increase in liquidity to mortgage originators who actively participate in the securitization mortgage market, and the reduction in lending costs from better reallocation of resources in the economy.

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A Data Sources

Home Mortgage Disclosure Act - HMDA

Here I describe the details about the data set and the construction of variables used in the analysis of Section 2. HMDA requires mortgage originators, banks and non-bank institutions, to collect and publicly disclose information about their mortgage lending activity. The information includes characteristics of the mortgage loan an institution originate or purchase during a calendar year. HMDA is estimated to represent the near universe of home lending in the United States, see [Neil et al. \(2017\)](#). I construct a panel of mortgage originator-institutions for the period 1990-2016. First, I use the Loan Application Registries(LAR) to compute aggregate volumes, in dollar amount and loan counts, of mortgages originated and mortgages sold in the secondary market every year for every reporter institution. As is standard in the literature, I restrict the sample to conventional, one-to-four family, owner-occupied dwellings, and include both home purchases and refinanced mortgage loans. Second, I use the HMDA Reporter Panel which contain the records of originator-institutions (reporter). Variables of interest are the type of institution (Bank Holding Company, Independent Mortgage Company, Affiliate Mortgage Company), the institution supervisory government agency, and assets. Finally, I merge the collapsed LARs dataset with the Panel of Reporters using the unique reporter ID. From 1990 to 2016 the HMDA panel covers 8,127 mortgage reporters every year on average.

Table 9: Description of HMDA LAR and Reporter Panel files

Period	File type	Observations
1990-2003	.dat	Source: https://catalog.archives.gov . See document 233.1-24ADL.pdf for a description of data-file length of fields. Starting 2004 length of fields was changed.
2004-2013	.dat	Source: https://catalog.archives.gov . For 2010 numbers coincide with tables from National Aggregates reported on FFIEC
2014-2017	.csv	Source: Consumer of Finance Protection Bureau. https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/hmda/

RMBS Issuance. Data on Residential Mortgage Backed Security issuance is taken from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). Source: <https://www.sifma>.

[org/resources/](#). The volume of issuance for Agency are obtained by adding up the dollar amount of RMBS issuance of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae. The volume of RMBS issuance for non-agency corresponds to private institutions other than Government Sponsored Entities.

Households Income. I compute the cyclical component, Hodrick-Prescott filter, of Households Disposable Personal Income from the Flow of Funds account divided by GDP deflator (2015 base). Source: Table F.101 Households and Nonprofit Organizations.

Default rates. Corresponds to the national delinquency rate for mortgage loans that are 90 or more days delinquent or went into foreclosure. Source: National Mortgage Database (NMDB).


Mortgage Interest rates. I use the average 30 year fixed mortgage rate from Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey 2018.

Guarantee Fees. Taken from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Single-Family Guarantee Fees Reports provided by the Federal Housing and Finance Administration (FHFA). Source: <https://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports>.

B Additional Figures and Tables

Aggregates in the Mortgage Market


Figure 9: Primary and secondary mortgage markets



Source: New issuance of mortgage loans (left), and Sales of mortgage loans in the secondary market (middle) are from HMDA. New issuance of residential mortgage backed securities, RMBS, (right) from SIFMA. Agency corresponds to RMBS issuance by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Non-agency correspond to issuance by private institutions different from GSEs. Number are in real term, base year 2015.

Mortgage Lending and Sales

Figure 10: Volume of new lending and loan sales across originators



Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2016.

New issuance of mortgage loans (y-axis), and Sales of mortgage loans in the secondary market (x-axis).

Dynamic Panel Estimations

I perform a dynamic panel data estimation following the methodology in Arellano and Bond (1991) to document that the volumes of mortgage lending at the level of the originating institution are negatively associated with aggregate measures of households default on their mortgage obligations, and households aggregate disposable personal income. Table 10 show this, I control by asset size and funding costs which have the predicted sign.

Table 10: Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation

Dependent var: log(lending)	
lending vol USD, first lag	0.143
default rate	-0.037
10yr TB rate	-0.364
DPI growth rate	-0.011
log (assets USD)	0.112
Number of obs	22,356
Period	1990-2016

$p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$. Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2016.

Dependent variable is the logarithm of the aggregate volume of lending in USD of 2015 at the level of the mortgage originator. Default rate corresponds to the fraction of single family mortgage loans that are delinquent 90 days or more, or in foreclosure. DPI stands for disposable personal income from NIPA.

Table 11 shows the estimate for the volume of sales at the level of originator against the same measure of aggregate households' default and income, using the same set of controls. HMDA reports the type of purchases of loans in the secondary market, so it is possible to differentiate between sales of loans to the agency segment, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and to other private institutions. It is interesting that even when breaking down by market segments, the magnitude and signs of correlations of the volume of sales with respect to all variables are of similar magnitude as those observed for the volume of lending.

Table 11: Fixed effects, panel regression

Dependent var: log(sales)	Priv segment	Agency segment
default rate	-0.060	-0.040
10yr TB rate	-0.436	-0.405
DPI growth rate	0.015	-0.052
log (assets)	0.121	0.277
R-sq	0.0717	0.0310
Number of obs	5,163	17,443
Period	1990-2016	1990-2016

$p < 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.001$. Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2016

Dependent variable is the logarithm of the aggregate volume of loan sales in USD of 2015 at the level of the mortgage originator. Default rate corresponds to the fraction of single family mortgage loans that are delinquent 90 days or more, or in foreclosure. DPI stands for disposable personal income from NIPA.


Cross Sectional Distribution of Mortgage Lending Activity

Table 12: Market share of lenders by volume of origination, average 1990-2017

	Small Bank	Large Bank	Credit U.	Auto Mtg Co.	Ind. Mtg Co	All
loan count in thousands						
All institutions	1,163	4,686	454	2,984	3,463	12,751
Share of Inst >= 1K loans	0.37	0.98	0.45	0.98	0.95	0.90
USD amount in millions						
All institutions	168,066	1,007,588	59,581	599,329	712,250	2,546,875
Share of Inst >= 1K loans	0.41	0.97	0.50	0.98	0.93	0.91

Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2017.

Figure 11: Number of mortgage originators




Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2017.

Table 13: Moments of the distribution of mortgage lending

Moments	90-06	90-16
Market share top 1%	0.62	0.64
Market share top 10%	0.89	0.90
Market share top 25%	0.96	0.96
Lending top 10% to bottom 90%	9.22	9.30
Mean/median	18.5	18.9
Average number of institutions	8,596	8,206

Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2017


Figure 12: Primary mortgage market, market share of the volume of lending



Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2017.

BHC & Thrifts refers to Bank Holding Companies and Thrifts Holding Companies including their affiliates. This category also includes savings institutions like Credit Unions.

Figure 13: Sales by type of Institution




Source: HMDA LARs and Reporter Panel 1990-2017.

BHC & Thrifts refers to Bank Holding Companies and Thrifts Holding Companies including their affiliates. This category also includes savings institutions like Credit Unions.

Mortgage Default Rates

Figure 14: National delinquency rates



Source: National Mortgage Database (NMDB), Federal Housing Finance Agency


Table 14: National delinquency rates

Period	30/60 dd		90+ dd	
	02-18	90-18	90-06	06-18
mean	2.35	2.01	1.22	3.06
std	0.56	1.42	0.17	1.61

Source: National Mortgage Database (NMDB), Federal Housing Finance Agency

Income and Default Rates

Figure 15: Income and default processes



Panel a. Household Income corresponds to the cyclical component of Disposable Personal Income from NIPA.

Panel b. Default rate corresponds to the percentage of delinquent mortgage loans 90 days or more, or in foreclosure. Source: National Mortgage Database, FHFA.

Estimation of Exogenous Processes

For households' income I use the cyclical component of the Disposable Personal Income from the Flow of Funds account. I estimate the following an auto-regressive model of first order, AR(1), for the period of analysis 1990-2006.

$$Y_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Y_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \quad \epsilon_t \sim N(0; \sigma_y^2)$$

where $S_t = [Y_t; 1]^T$. The discretization of the AR processes into a Markov chain of first order yields:

Table 15: Joint Markov Process for income and default rates

State	s_1	s_2	s_3	s_4	s_5	s_6	s_7	s_8	s_9	s_{10}
Y	0.980	0.980	0.990	0.990	1.000	1.000	1.010	1.010	1.020	1.020
$\frac{2}{i}$	0.078	0.203	0.078	0.203	0.078	0.203	0.078	0.203	0.078	0.203
Stationary Prob										
Prob	0.035	0.028	0.176	0.074	0.340	0.035	0.244	0.006	0.062	0.000


The Markov process fits well the unconditional means and standard deviations for income, and default rate, and the negative correlation between income and delinquency rates. Table 16 shows the moments obtained from a simulated time series of 100,00 periods versus the data moments

Table 16: Fitted moments for time series

	mc simulation	data, 90-06
Y mean	1.0	1.0
Y std	0.010	
γ std	0.69	0.69
$\text{corr}(Y, \frac{2}{i})$	-0.35	

Mortgage Interest Rates

Figure 16: Historic mortgage interest rates



Source: Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey 2018.

Mortgage spread is the difference between the 30 year fixed mortgage rates and a 10 year treasury bill rate. Mortgage rate correspond to the real rate obtained from subtracting 10 year expected inflation to the nominal 30 year fixed mortgage rate.

Table 17: Historic average mortgage rates

Period	90-06	13-18
spread	1.60	1.68
std	0.27	0.10
rate	5.34	2.10
std	1.23	0.36


Source: Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey 2018.

Mortgage spread is the difference between the 30 year fixed mortgage rate and a 10 year treasury bill rate. Mortgage rate correspond to the real rate obtained from subtracting the 10 year expected inflation to the nominal 30 year fixed mortgage rate.

C Model Simulations

C.1 The Great Recession

Figure 17: Household aggregates during the Great Recession



Panel a: Data corresponds to the percentage of delinquent mortgage loans 90 days or more, or in foreclosure. Source: National Mortgage Database, FHFA.

Panel b: Data is the flow of residential real estate investment in 2015 prices from the flow of funds. All series are shown as the percentage change with respect to 2006.

D Computational Algorithm

D.1 Solving the General Equilibrium Model

I solve the model in a discrete state space for endogenous and exogenous state variables. Exogenous states are characterized by a joint state space $(\zeta; Y) \subseteq L \times Y$, and an associated transition Π_S matrix. The aggregate endogenous states for debt and housing holdings are given by the space $B \times H$. The space of all aggregate state is given by $X \subseteq L \times Y \times B \times H$. Because the problem is computationally demanding, I set a grid of 30 points for B , 30 points for H , and 10 points for the joint state space $(\zeta; Y)$.

Solving the model consists on finding:

- policy, and value functions for borrower's problem;
- schedule of prices $f(q(X)); p(X)g$ for all realizations of the aggregate state vector $X \subseteq X$.

Notice that given the closed form characterization of lenders' decision rules, the market clearing

system of equations:

$$N^D(q; X) = N^S(p; q; X)$$

$$D(X) = S(X)$$

can be analytically expressed as:

$$B^{0D}(X) (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)B = B\Omega(p; q; X) \quad (26)$$

$$(1 - \beta)[\beta + (1 - \beta)F(p=q)] = \Theta(p; q; X) \quad (27)$$

where $\Omega(p; q; X)$ is derived analytically from equation (23), $\Theta(p; q; X)$ is derived analytically from equation (24). Thus the only unknown function is borrower's policy function $B^{0D}(p; q; X)$ which defines credit demand.

Furthermore, given the assumption of exogenous default rate borrower's debt has not an effect on default probability, the borrower observes a price schedule $q(B^0; B; X)$ that is a function of current realized aggregate states, and tomorrow's debt level. Hence, it is possible to solve the model in two steps: first we obtain the set of price schedules $f q; p g$ for all states X and transitions to $(B^0; X^0)$, and then we use them to solve borrower's problem. The algorithm is as follow:

1. Jointly compute price schedules $f q(X); p(X) g$, for every $X \geq X$.
 - (a) Notice that for all realizations $X \geq X$, we can compute borrower's credit demand, $N^D = B^0(B; H; X) (1 - \beta)(1 - \delta)B$, from transitioning from every combination of current states $f B; X g$ to $f B^0; X g$.
 - (b) For every combination in a) solve the system of equations from the market clearing conditions equations (26)-(27).
2. Given the set of price schedules $q(B^0; X)$, solve for $f C(X); H^0(X); B^0(X) g$ borrower's policy functions.
 - (a) I solve borrower's problem by grid search global solution methods iterating over the value function .
3. Integrate demand and supply in each market and check that market clearing conditions are satisfied at market prices $f q(X); p(X) g$ for every $X \geq X$.

D.2 Welfare evaluation

This section explain the approach we follow for the welfare evaluation. We compute two metrics, one based in the consumption equivalent units of the non-durable consumption good, and another taking into account changes in the services from the housing good.

Define $\tilde{V}(\tilde{c}; \tilde{h})$ as the lifetime utility under the benchmark economy and $V(c; h)$ the utility under an alternative economy subject to the same aggregate exogenous states S_t . We evaluate welfare as the fraction of non-durable consumption allocation, in the benchmark economy, a household will be willing to forego in order to be indifferent to live under the alternative specification. Hence, the permanent consumption loss is such that:

$$\begin{aligned}
E_{t|t_0} V(c_t; h_t; S_t) &= E_{t|t_0} V((1 - \beta) \tilde{c}_t; \tilde{h}_t; S_t) \\
&= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (1 - \beta) \log((1 - \beta) \tilde{c}_t) + \log \tilde{h}_t \\
&= \frac{(1 - \beta) \log(1 - \beta)}{1 - \beta} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t ((1 - \beta) \log \tilde{c}_t + \log \tilde{h}_t) \\
\log(1 - \beta) &= \frac{1}{1 - \beta} E_{t|t_0} V(c_t; h_t; S_t) - E_{t|t_0} V(\tilde{c}_t; \tilde{h}_t; S_t) \\
&= 1 - \exp \left(\frac{1}{1 - \beta} E_{t|t_0} (V - \tilde{V}) \right)
\end{aligned}$$

> 0 indicates welfare losses associated to transitionning from the benchmark economy to the alternative economy, as the household is willing to sacrifice a positive amount of her benchmark consumption allocation in order to be indifferent with the alternative economy.

The second metric, we evaluate consumption equivalent change for both goods:

$$\begin{aligned}
E_{t|t_0} V(c_t; h_t; S_t) &= E_{t|t_0} V((1 - \beta) \tilde{c}_t; \tilde{h}_t; S_t) \\
&= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (1 - \beta) \log((1 - \beta) \tilde{c}_t) + \log((1 - \beta) \tilde{h}_t) \\
&= \frac{\log(1 - \beta)}{1 - \beta} + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t ((1 - \beta) \log \tilde{c}_t + \log \tilde{h}_t) \\
\log(1 - \beta) &= (1 - \beta) E_{t|t_0} V(c_t; h_t; S_t) - E_{t|t_0} V(\tilde{c}_t; \tilde{h}_t; S_t) \\
&= 1 - \exp \left((1 - \beta) E_{t|t_0} (V - \tilde{V}) \right)
\end{aligned}$$

E Proofs to Lemmas and Propositions

E.1 Derivation of default threshold $\bar{\omega}$

The recursive representation of the representative borrower household problem

$$V(B_t; H_t; X_t) = \max_{C_t; N_t; H_{t+1}; \lambda} u(C_t; H_t) + \beta E_{X^j | X} V(B_{t+1}; H_{t+1}; X_{t+1}) \quad (28)$$

$$C_t + p_{h;t} H_{t+1} = Y_t + T_t^B + (1 - \tau_t)(1 - \lambda) p_{h;t} H_t - B_t + q_t N_t \quad (29)$$

$$B_{t+1} = (1 - \lambda)(1 - \tau_t) B_t + N_t \quad (30)$$

$$B_{t+1} \leq p_{h;t} H_{t+1} \quad (31)$$

$$N_t \geq 0; H_{t+1} \geq 0 \text{ given } B_0; H_0$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \tau_t &= \int_0^{\bar{\omega}} g_t(\omega) d\omega \\ &= \Pr[\omega_{i;t} \leq \bar{\omega}] \\ &= \int_0^{\bar{\omega}} g_t(\omega) d\omega \\ &= G_t(\bar{\omega}; \alpha; \beta) \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \omega_{i;t} &= E[\omega_{i;t} | \omega_{i;t} \leq \bar{\omega}] \\ &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \frac{G_t(\bar{\omega}; 1 + \alpha; \beta)}{G_t(\bar{\omega}; \alpha; \beta)} \end{aligned}$$

$$(1 - \tau_t) \omega_{i;t} = \alpha [1 - G_t(\bar{\omega}; 1 + \alpha; \beta)]$$

the optimal default threshold $\bar{\omega}$ can be derived by taking First Order Conditions of the above problem w.r.t $N_t; H_{t+1}; \lambda$:

$$\begin{aligned} N_t : \quad & U_{C;t}(q_t - \lambda) = \beta E[V_{B_{t+1}}] \\ H_{t+1} : \quad & U_{C;t} p_{h;t} (1 - \lambda) = \beta E[V_{H_{t+1}}] \end{aligned}$$

where $V_{B_{t+1}} = \partial V / \partial B_{t+1}$ and $E[V_{H_{t+1}}] = \partial V / \partial H_{t+1}$, and λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint, and $\lambda = \lambda_t U_{C;t}$.

The Envelope Theorem in this case

$$V_{B_t} = U_{c;t}(1 - \beta_t)(q_t(1 - \beta_t) + \beta_t)$$

$$V_{H_t} = U_{c;t}(1 - \beta_t) - \beta_t \rho_{h;t} + U_{H;t}$$

Combining equations from the Envelope theorem and the F.O.C. yields

$$q_t = \beta_t + \beta_t \mathbb{E} \frac{U_{c;t+1}(1 - \beta_{t+1})(q_{t+1}(1 - \beta_{t+1}) + \beta_{t+1})}{U_{c;t}}$$

$$\rho_{h;t}(1 - \beta_t) = \beta_t \mathbb{E} \frac{U_{c;t+1}}{U_{c;t}} (1 - \beta_{t+1}) - \beta_{t+1} \rho_{h;t+1} + \frac{U_{H;t+1}}{U_{c;t+1}}$$

The derivative of β_t and β_t functions are

$$\frac{\partial \beta_t}{\partial \beta_t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta_t} \int_0^Z g_t(\beta) d\beta$$

$$= g_t(\beta_t)$$

$$\frac{\partial [(1 - \beta_t) - \beta_t \rho_{h;t}]}{\partial \beta_t} = \frac{\partial}{\partial \beta_t} \int_0^1 g_t(\beta) d\beta$$

$$= -g_t(\beta_t)$$

Taking the F.O.C. of the value function w.r.t. β_t yields:

$$U_{c;t}(\beta_t g_t(\beta_t) \rho_{h;t} H_t + g_t(\beta_t) B_t) + \beta_t (1 - \beta_t) g_t(\beta_t) B_t = \beta_t \mathbb{E} \frac{\partial V}{\partial B_{t+1}} \frac{\partial B_{t+1}}{\partial \beta_t}$$

$$U_{c;t} g_t(\beta_t) (\beta_t \rho_{h;t} H_t + B_t) + U_{c;t} \beta_t (1 - \beta_t) g_t(\beta_t) B_t = \beta_t \mathbb{E} \frac{\partial V}{\partial B_{t+1}} (1 - \beta_t) g_t(\beta_t) B_t$$

$$U_{c;t} g_t(\beta_t) (\beta_t \rho_{h;t} H_t + B_t + \beta_t (1 - \beta_t) B_t) = (1 - \beta_t) g_t(\beta_t) B_t \beta_t \mathbb{E}[V_{B_{t+1}}]$$

$$U_{c;t} g_t(\beta_t) (\beta_t \rho_{h;t} H_t + B_t + \beta_t (1 - \beta_t) B_t) = (1 - \beta_t) g_t(\beta_t) B_t U_{c;t} (q_t - \beta_t)$$

$$\beta_t \rho_{h;t} H_t + B_t = (1 - \beta_t) B_t q_t$$

$$\beta_t = \frac{B_t [1 + (1 - \beta_t) q_t]}{\rho_{h;t} H_t}$$

E.2 Proof of Lemma 1

- Assumptions: i) lender holds one asset: budget set is linear in b . ii) homothetic preferences, $u(c) = \log(c)$, imply:

$$(a) \text{ policy functions are linear in } b: c(z; b; X); b^l(z; b; X); s_G(z; b; X); s_B(z; b; X); d(z; b; X)$$

- By assumption Z iid: Z^j is independent of b^j , also $\Gamma(z; b) = F(z)G(b)$.

3. For given f, p, g : aggregates S_G, S_B, D do not depend on the distribution of b . See additional derivations E.7.
4. Therefore, neither do market clearing values $p(X), q(X), \Gamma(X)$. See additional derivations E.7.
5. Thus, it is not necessary to know the distribution Γ to compute aggregate quantities and prices. B is a sufficient statistic.

E.3 Proof of Lemma 2

From the analysis in section 4.1 it follows that if there is a price $p > 0$ in the secondary market, then:

- Seller. For a lender j such that $z^j \in [z_a, p=q)$, trading decisions are: $f d^j = 0; s_G^j = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)^j b^j; s_B^j = (1 - \alpha) \beta g$. By replacing these policy functions in the law of motion of debt holdings, equation (??), it follows that the origination decision for a seller is $n^j = b^j$.
- Buyer. For a lender j such that $z^j \in (\frac{p}{q}, z_b]$, trading decisions are $f d^j > 0; s_G^j = 0; s_B^j = (1 - \alpha) \beta^j g$. Notice that n^j and d^j are alternative ways of saving resources. Originating one loan today costs $z^j q$ and pays off one unit tomorrow, while purchasing one loan in the secondary market today costs p and pays off $(1 - \alpha)$ units tomorrow. Hence, the return on saving by originating loans is $\frac{1}{z^j q}$, while the return for purchasing a loan is $\frac{1}{p}$. Given that $z^j > \frac{p}{q}$, the optimal decision is to set $n^j = 0$, and accumulate loans by purchasing existing loans in the secondary market. Replacing these decisions in the law of motion of debt holdings, equation (??), yields the policy function for purchases $d^j = \frac{b^j (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)^j}{1}$.
- Holder. For a lender j such that $z^j \in [\frac{p}{q}, \frac{p}{q}]$, trading decisions are $f d^j = 0; s_G^j = 0; s_B^j = (1 - \alpha) \beta^j g$. Replacing these decisions in the law of motion of debt holdings, equation (??), obtains $n^j = b^j (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)^j$.

In the case in which there is no positive price that clears the secondary market, the secondary market will not be active. Trading decisions for all lenders are trivial: $f d^j = 0; s_G^j = 0; s_B^j = 0g$. Replacing these decisions in the law of motion of debt holdings, equation (??), obtains the origination decision: $n^j = b^j (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)^j$.

E.4 Proof of Lemma 3

We will derive f, c, b^j, g policy functions by guess and verify.

1. Taking First Order Conditions w.r.t to b^l to program (16) obtains:

$$\begin{aligned} u_c q \min f_Z; \frac{p=q}{1} g &= {}^L E_{X^0|X} V_{b^l}(b^l; z^l; X^l) \\ &= {}^L E_{X^0|X} u_{c^l} W_{b^l}(b^l; z^l; X^l) \end{aligned}$$

where the second equation holds because of the Envelope theorem, and $W_b = \frac{\partial W(b; z; X)}{\partial b}$ is the marginal change in a lender's virtual wealth, equation (15), of increasing debt claims in one unit. Given that preferences are assumed to be logarithm:

$$\frac{1}{c} q \min f_Z; \frac{p=q}{1} g = {}^L E_{X^0|X} \frac{1}{c^l} W_{b^l}(b^l; z^l; X^l)$$

2. Guess that the policy function for consumption has the form: $c = W(b; z; X)$, where $c \geq 0$. Then, from budget constraint in (16) it implies:

$$b^l = \frac{(1 - \beta) W(b; z; X)}{q \min f_Z; \frac{p=q}{1} g}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} c^l &= W(b^l; z^l; X^l) \\ &= W_{b^l}(b^l; z^l; X^l) b^l \\ &= W_{b^l}(b^l; z^l; X^l) \frac{(1 - \beta) W(b; z; X)}{q \min f_Z; \frac{p=q}{1} g} \end{aligned}$$

3. Replacing expression for c^l in the Euler equation obtains:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{c} q \min f_Z; \frac{p=q}{1} g &= {}^L E_{X^0|X} \frac{q \min f_Z; \frac{p=q}{1} g W_{b^l}(b^l; z^l; X^l)}{W_{b^l}(b^l; z^l; X^l) [(1 - \beta) W(b; z; X)]} \\ \frac{1}{W(b; z; X)} &= {}^L E_{X^0|X} \frac{1}{(1 - \beta) W(b; z; X)} \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

which yields:

$$\begin{aligned} c &= (1 - \beta) W(b; z; X) \\ b^l &= \frac{(1 - \beta) W(b; z; X)}{q \min f_Z; \frac{p=q}{1} g} \end{aligned}$$

E.5 Proof of Lemma 4

Suppose there is a lender for whom the solutions of each program differ. Such lenders must be a buyer or a holder, since both programs are identical for sellers. Then, at least one buyer or holder chooses $b^j < (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)b$ but given the non-negativity constraint on purchases, it must be that such buyer purchases $d = 0$. By revealed preferences, if every buyer chooses to buy zero then aggregate demand $D = 0$.

E.6 Proof of Lemma 5

If there is a $\rho > 0$ that clears the secondary market, by Lemma 2 the policy function of lenders with origination costs below the second equilibrium cut-off imply a strictly positive amount of new loan issuance, see Lemma 2. Hence, the last marginal lender to issue new loans is such that $z^j = \frac{\rho q}{1 - (\rho - q)}$ and the right hand side determines the cut-off Z .

Instead, whenever the price that clears the secondary market is given by $\rho = 0$, the virtual wealth function of the lender reduces to $W = b[(1 - \alpha) + (1 - \beta)(1 - \alpha)zq]$. Using the optimal saving policy function in Lemma 3 the policy function of new loan issuance for lenders becomes $n = \frac{L}{zq}b(1 - \alpha) - (1 - \beta)(1 - \alpha)(1 - \alpha)b$. Then, we can derive the upper bound for a lender's origination cost Z so that a lenders issues a strictly positive amount of new loans

$$\frac{L}{(1 - \beta)(1 - \alpha)} \frac{1}{q} > Z$$

the left hand side determines the cut-off Z when the price of securities in the secondary market is zero. Lastly, this upper bound is relevant as long as it is within the support of the origination costs drawn by lenders, the min function incorporates that.

E.7 Additional derivations

For Proof of Lemma 1

1. Given that we assume $Z = \frac{L}{q}$, and the linearity of policy functions on b , the aggregate supply and demand of debt claims in the secondary market $fS; Dg$ do not depend on the distribution of b , this can be shown by working out the expressions for supply and demand in the secondary market from the definitions.

(a) Supply, $S(X)$

$$\begin{aligned}
S(X) &= S_B(X) + S_G(X) \\
&= \int s_B(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) + \int s_G(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\
&= \int \int s_B(b; z; X) dG(b)dF(z) + \int \int s_B(b; z; X) dG(b)dF(z) \\
&= \int \int (1 - \rho) b dG(b)dF(z) + \int \int (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho) b dG(b)dF(z) \\
&= (1 - \rho) \int \int b dG(b) dF(z) + (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho) \int \int b dG(b) dF(z) \\
&= (1 - \rho) \int B dF(z) + (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho) \int B dF(z) \\
&= B(1 - \rho) \int dF(z) + (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho) \int dF(z) \\
&= B(1 - \rho) [1 + (1 - \rho) F(\rho = q)]
\end{aligned}$$

(b) Demand, $D(X)$

$$\begin{aligned}
D(X) &= \int d(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\
&= \int \int d(b; z; X) dG(b)dF(z) \\
&= \int \int \frac{b^\rho (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho) b}{z^{\rho = q} z^{\rho = q}} dG(b)dF(z) \\
&= \frac{1}{1 - \rho} \int \int b^\rho dG(b)dF(z) (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho) \int \int b dG(b)dF(z) \\
&= \frac{1}{1 - \rho} \int \int \frac{1}{z^{\rho = q}} (1 - \rho) \hat{+} (1 - \rho) \rho + (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho) z^{\rho = q} B dF(z) \\
&= \frac{1}{1 - \rho} (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho) B \int \int dF(z) \\
&= \frac{1}{1 - \rho} F(z^{\rho = q}) B \frac{1}{z^{\rho = q}} [(1 - \rho) \hat{+} (1 - \rho) z^{\rho = q} + (1 - \rho) \rho] (1 - \rho) (1 - \rho)
\end{aligned}$$

where $z^{\rho = q} = \frac{\rho}{1 - (\rho = q)}$. It follows that the market clearing values of $f\rho; g$ do not depend on the distribution of b either.

2. The price of debt q does not depend on the distribution of debt holdings across lenders because the market clearing condition in the credit market is a function only of the aggregate level of debt B .

(a) Demand of credit from borrowers depends only on aggregates states $fB; H; ; Yg$ through the policy function of $B^\rho(B; H; X)$. Hence, the distribution of debt claims is irrelevant

from the stand point of the borrower:

$$N^B = B^{0B} (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) B^B$$

- (b) Supply of credit from lenders correspond to the integral across the individual originations n^i . Given that lending policy functions are linear in b , the aggregate supply of lending is linear in the aggregate amount of debt claims in the economy B . This can be seen from the aggregation of the origination decisions.

$$N^L = \int n(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z)$$

There are two possible expressions for the aggregate supply of credit. The first case when the secondary market is active meaning $\rho > 0$,

$$\begin{aligned} N^{\text{seller}} &= \int n(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\ &= \int_{p=q}^Z \int_{z_a}^Z b^h dG(b) dF(z) \\ &= \int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{zq} (1 - \rho) \hat{+} (1 - \rho) \rho \int_{p=q}^Z b^i dG(b) dFz \\ &= B \frac{1}{q} (1 - \rho) \hat{+} (1 - \rho) \rho \int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{z} dFz \\ N^{\text{holder}} &= \int n(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\ &= \int_{z^m=q}^Z \int_{z_a}^Z b^h (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) b^i dG(b) dF(z) \\ &= \int_{z^m=q}^Z \frac{1}{zq} (1 - \rho) \hat{+} (1 - \rho) \rho + (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) \rho \int_{p=q}^Z b^i dG(b) dFz \\ &= \int_{z^m=q}^Z (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) \rho \int_{z_a}^Z b^i dG(b) dFz \\ &= B \frac{1}{q} (1 - \rho) \hat{+} (1 - \rho) \rho \int_{z^m=q}^Z \frac{1}{z} dFz + (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) B \int_{z^m=q}^Z \frac{1}{z} dFz \\ &= B \frac{1}{q} (1 - \rho) \hat{+} (1 - \rho) \rho \log(z) f(z) \Big|_{z^m=q}^{z^m=q} \\ &= B(1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) (F(z^m=q) - F(p=q)) \\ N^L &= N^{\text{seller}} + N^{\text{holder}} \end{aligned}$$

The case when there is no trade in secondary markets (or alternatively all assets trade at $\rho = 0$) and each lender originates loans using its own technology.

$$\begin{aligned}
N^L &= \int_{z_b}^{\hat{z}} n(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\
&= \int_{z_b}^{\hat{z}} b^\theta(b; z; X) (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) b dG(b) dF(z) \\
&= \int_{z_b}^{\hat{z}} \frac{z_a}{z} \frac{b}{zq} (1 - \rho) \hat{b} + (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) zq \frac{b}{z} dG(b) dF(z) \\
&= \int_{z_a}^{\hat{z}} (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) \frac{b}{z} dG(b) dFz \\
&= B(1 - \rho) \frac{\hat{z}}{q} \int_{z_a}^{\hat{z}} \frac{1}{z} dF(z) (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho)
\end{aligned}$$

Budget sets by type of lender

Replacing optimal origination and trading decisions of Lemma 2 in the budget constraint and law of motion of the lenders problem (5) obtains:

- Buyers:

$$\begin{aligned}
c + \rho \frac{b^\theta (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) b}{1} &= (1 - \rho) \hat{b} + (1 - \rho) \rho b \\
c + z^m b^\theta &= (1 - \rho) \hat{b} + (1 - \rho) \rho + (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) z^m b
\end{aligned}$$

where $z^m = \rho(1 - \rho)$.

- Sellers:

$$\begin{aligned}
c + zq b^\theta &= (1 - \rho) \hat{b} + (1 - \rho) \rho b + (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) \rho b \\
c + zqb^\theta &= [(1 - \rho) + (1 - \rho) \rho] b
\end{aligned}$$

- Holder:

$$\begin{aligned}
c + zq[b^\theta (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) b] &= (1 - \rho) \hat{b} + (1 - \rho) \rho b \\
c + zqb^\theta &= [(1 - \rho) + (1 - \rho) \rho + (1 - \rho)(1 - \rho) zq] b
\end{aligned}$$

F Model's Properties

F.1 Comparative Statics

Lemma 6. The share of non-performing loans traded in the market is increasing in the default rate and decreasing in the cut-off \hat{z} .

Proof: by definition

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\hat{z}) &= \frac{S_B(\hat{z})}{\int_{z_a}^{z_b} (1 - F(z)) b \, d\Gamma(z; b)} \\
 &= \frac{S_B(\hat{z}) + S_G(\hat{z})}{\int_{z_a}^{\hat{z}} (1 - F(z)) B + \int_{\hat{z}}^{z_b} S_G dF} \\
 &= \frac{S_B(\hat{z}) + S_G(\hat{z})}{(1 - F(\hat{z}))}
 \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality using: $S_G = \int_{z_a}^{\hat{z}} (1 - F(z)) b \, d\Gamma(z; b)$. F is the CDF of z . Then,

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{z}} &= \frac{F(\hat{z})}{(1 - F(\hat{z}))^2} > 0 \\
 \frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{z}} &= \frac{1 - f(\hat{z})}{(1 - F(\hat{z}))^2} < 0
 \end{aligned}$$

Assumption A1: $\frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{z}} [z_a; z_b]$:

$$\frac{1}{\hat{z}} \left(1 + \frac{1}{1 - F(\hat{z})} \right) < m(\hat{z})$$

where $m(\hat{z}) = \frac{F(\hat{z})}{f(\hat{z})}$ is the mills ratio or hazard rate of \hat{z} .

Lemma 2. Under assumption A1, $\frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{z}}$ is decreasing in \hat{z} :

Conjecture that exist a market cut-off \hat{z} that satisfies A1, then an increase in \hat{z} leads to a decrease in $\frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{z}}$.

Proof.

We want the ratio $\frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{z}}$ to be decreasing in \hat{z} .

– for $\frac{d}{d\hat{z}} < 0$ to hold it must be that:

$$\frac{1}{\hat{z}} \left(1 + \frac{1}{1 - F(\hat{z})} \right) < m(\hat{z})$$

– $m(\hat{z}) = \frac{f(\hat{z})}{F(\hat{z})}$ is the inverse mills ratio or hazard rate.

F.2 The Role of the Secondary Market

Proposition 5.1 In steady state, in an environment under complete information an economy with trade in the Securitization Market features lower mortgage rates than in the absence of this market, i.e. the discounted price of mortgage debt satisfies: $q^{CI} > q^{NSM}$.

Proof. The proof consists in showing that the implied discount price of new mortgage debt satisfied the above relation. First, I derive the analytical expression for each discounted price and then verify the inequality.

In steady state the demand for new loans in primary market is given by

$$N_{ss}^D = B_{ss}(1 - \rho)(1 - \delta_{ss})$$

Under complete information non-performing loans are not traded since all lenders can easily identify them and their payoff is zero.

If lenders have access to a securitization market, their consumption, saving and trading decisions can be derived in similar fashion to Lemma 2. In this case, there is only one cutoff Z . All lenders self-classify into two groups: sellers and buyers. Seller are lenders that decide to sell their entire portfolio of loans and buyers are lenders that decide to buy securities, that are a representative bundle of the market. Importantly, buyers do not issue new loans. In the aggregate, the total supply of new loans is given by integrating the supply of new loans from sellers:

$$\begin{aligned} N_{ss}^S &= \int_{z_a}^Z n^{CI}(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\ &= B_{ss} \frac{L}{q^{CI}} (1 - \delta_{ss}) \left(1 + \rho(1 - \delta_{ss}) \right) \int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{Z} dF Z \\ &= B_{ss} \frac{1}{q^{CI}} (1 - \delta_{ss}) \int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{Z} dF Z + B_{ss} L (1 - \delta_{ss}) Z (1 - \delta_{ss}) \int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{Z} dF Z \end{aligned}$$

Notice that aggregate supply is a function of the discounted price of debt. Then, using market clearing condition for the primary market $N_{ss}^D = N_{ss}^S$ we can derive an expression for the discounted price of new mortgage debt in steady state:

$$q_{ss}^{CI} = \frac{L(1 - \delta_{ss}) \int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{Z} dF Z}{1 - (1 - \delta_{ss})(1 - \delta_{ss}) \int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{Z} dF Z} \quad (32)$$

If lenders do not have access to a securitization market their decisions can be derived directly from Lemma 2. In steady state the aggregate credit supply is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} N_{ss}^{NSM} &= \int_{z_a}^{Z_b} n^{NSM}(b; z; X) d\Gamma(b; z) \\ &= \frac{1}{q^{NSM}} L(1 - \delta_{ss}) B_{ss} \int_{z_a}^{Z_b} \frac{1}{Z} dF Z + (1 - L)(1 - \delta_{ss}) B_{ss} \end{aligned}$$

Then, using market clearing condition for the primary market we can derive an expression for the discounted price of new mortgage debt in steady state:

$$q_{ss}^{NSM} = \frac{L(1 - \delta_{ss}) \int_{z_a}^{Z_b} \frac{1}{Z} dF Z}{1 - L(1 - \delta_{ss})(1 - \delta_{ss})} \quad (33)$$

The last step consist in comparing equations (32) and (33). Notice that the numerator must satisfy

$$\int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{Z} dF Z > \int_{z_a}^{Z_b} \frac{1}{Z} dF Z \quad \delta Z < Z_b$$

which is the case for the calibration of the support of the origination costs. For the denominator the condition boils down to:

$$\frac{1}{L} + \int_{z_a}^Z \frac{1}{z} dFz > 1$$

which is always the case given that $L < 1$ and $\int_{z_a}^R \frac{1}{z} dFz > 0$.